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Abstract 
At the turn of the first millennium, a group of Norman adventurers arrived in the 
Byzantine territories of southern Italy and within a century had conquered the entire 
region, putting an end to imperial rule in the Mezzogiorno. This thesis examines the 
reactions of cities to the Norman Conquest as imperial forces crumbled in the face of 
their advance. After centuries of Byzantine rule in the region, urban polities had grown 
accustomed to a mode of government that acknowledged the legitimacy of popular 
political participation, which may have had its roots in the often ignored republican 
heritage of citizens of the Eastern Roman Empire. The presence of political agency 
challenges our conception of imperial authority as tyrannical and unresponsive. In the 
final analysis, cities exhibited hitherto unacknowledged political agency as they sought to 
defend their urban autonomy during the transition to Norman rule at the close of the 
eleventh century. 
Keywords:  Byzantine Italy; Political Agency; Urban Autonomy; Imperial Authority; 
Eleventh Century; Republicanism 
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 1 
Introduction 
 In the late summer of 1155, a Byzantine army, under the command of the 
sebastos Michael Palaiologos and the disgruntled nephew of King Roger II of Sicily, 
Robert Bassonville arrived outside the city of Bari (the Greek, Varis).1 The inhabitants, 
were divided in their loyalty to their Sicilian overlords, so when Palaiologos addressed 
the Baresi with promises of the benefits of imperial rule, some listened; when gold was 
offered to sweeten the deal, they acted. A large portion of the inhabitants went over to 
the Byzantines, while the Sicilian garrison, along with their remaining supporters, 
retreated to the city’s citadel. The sources record the divisions in the city that this golden 
ruse created: “it was really something worthy of wonder, to see those lately united in 
race and purpose today sundered by gold as if by a wall, feeling hatred toward one 
another and already divided by deeds. So things went there.”2 The citadel was breached 
shortly thereafter and the city was captured by the Byzantines. The Baresi had not 
known a Byzantine government since the city fell in 1071 to the Norman Duke, Robert 
Guiscard, however, rather than celebrating their return to the empire, the inhabitants 
instead took steps to guarantee their autonomy. Turning against the city’s citadel, “they 
demolished it to the foundation and got rid of it, although the general was strongly 
opposed to this and asked to purchase it for much money.”3 However, their renewed 
independence was not to last. Several years later, when Bari returned to Sicilian 
dominion, King William I ‘the Bad,’ beheld the ruined foundations of his royal citadel and 
said: “My judgment against you will be just: since you refused to spare my house, I will 
certainly not spare your houses; but I will allow you to leave freely with your property.”4 
The Baresi were given two days to evacuate before William tore down the city’s walls 
                                                     
1 Primary account: Kinnamos  IV.1-3, pp.106-110; Choniates II.91, p.53; Falcandus 8, pp.73-74; 
Romuald, pp.223-224.  See also the summary in: J.J. Norwich, The Kingdom in the Sun, 1130-
1194 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 187. 
2 Kinnamos IV.3, p.109. 
3 Kinnamos IV.3, p.110. 
4 Falcandus 8, pp.73-74. 
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and leveled their homes, leaving only the cathedral of St. Nicholas standing. The 
sources explain: “that is why the most powerful city in Apulia, celebrated by fame and 
immensely rich, proud in its noble citizens and remarkable in the architecture of its 
buildings, now lies transformed into piles of rubble.”5 
The Baresi had an uneasy relationship with authority and jealously guarded their 
autonomy. The royal citadel that they destroyed, at the cost of their homes, was a hated 
symbol of subjugation. Indeed, two decades earlier, in 1132, they killed the Saracen 
workers sent to construct the fortress and extracted a promise from the King not to 
continue with the project, a promise that he ultimately broke.6 Earlier still, in 1087, 
sixteen years after the end of the Byzantine presence in southern Italy, the Baresi 
levelled the city’s praetorion, the seat of imperial power in the Mezzogiorno, in order to 
make room for the construction of the cathedral of St. Nicholas.7 The city’s annals 
similarly record the tension between citizens and the imperial and later ducal power 
structures that they inhabited, as the Baresi asserted their autonomy. The Baresi were 
not alone in these expressions, as city after city, throughout southern Italy sought to 
have their voices heard, first under the Byzantines and then later under their Norman 
conquerors. This thesis is the story of these voices and the urban autonomy that such 
assertions of popular opinion and action exemplified, as it existed under Byzantine rule 
in southern Italy during the Norman Conquest of the region, in the eleventh century. 
What does a medieval state look like?  
In the course of this investigation into urban political agency, this thesis speaks to 
ongoing debates about the nature of imperial authority throughout the Byzantine Empire. 
Fundamental to these debates is the nature of the relationship between the Byzantine 
                                                     
5 Falcandus 8, p.74. 
6 Telese II.34, 49, pp.16, 19. 
7 Translatio S. Nich. 18, pp.65-66. 
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state, broadly conceived, and its citizens.8 The image of Byzantium as an autocratic, 
absolutist state and the negative connotations associated with it can be traced back to 
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century critiques against French absolutism. The 
French historian Charles Le Beau and the English Romanist Edward Gibbon both 
directed critiques against the Byzantine emperors. A young Karl Marx, echoing his 
philosophic father, Hegel, went so far as to call the empire the “worst state.”9 Similarly, 
others writing in the twentieth century have read totalitarian aspects in the Eastern 
Roman Empire and drawn comparisons with Tsarist and later, Soviet, Russia.10 There 
has been a tendency to associate Byzantium with a strong tyrannical central 
government, in short everything that we moderns find odious.11 
The picture on the ground, however, is a much more nuanced affair. Recent 
historiography has pointed to the central role played by the Byzantine capital, 
Constantinople. The ‘Queen of Cities’ or just plain ‘The City’ as it was sometimes called, 
was the cultural, economic and political centre of the empire, a bias that is well 
represented in the primary sources.12 Indeed, it has been argued that the capital stunted 
                                                     
8 On states, ancient and medieval, see the discussion in: Jack A. Goldstone and John F. Haldon, 
“Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation: Problems and Perspectives,” in The Dynamics of 
Ancient Empires: State Power from Assyria to Byzantium, eds. Ian Morris and Walter Scheidel 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-29. Haldon, in the same volume, questions whether 
Byzantium was in fact an empire. See: John F. Haldon, “The Byzantine Empire,” in The Dynamics 
of Ancient Empires: State Power from Assyria to Byzantium, eds. Ian Morris and Walter Scheidel 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 205. 
9 Alexander Kazhdan and Giles Constable, People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to 
Modern Byzantine Studies (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 
1982), 10. Hegel said of the Byzantine Empire: “Its general aspect presents a disgusting picture 
of imbecility; wretched, nay, insane passions, stifle the growth of all that is noble in thoughts, 
deeds, and persons.” G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History with prefaces by Charles Hegel 
and Translator, J. Sibree, M.A. (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 358. 
10 See for example: Ihor Ševčenko, “Was there totalitarianism in Byzantium? Constantinople’s 
control over its Asiatic Hinterland in the early ninth century,” in Constantinople and its Hinterland: 
Papers from the Twenty-seventh symposium of Byzantine Studies, Oxford, April 1993, eds. Cyril 
Mango and Gilbert Dagron (Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1995), 91-105; Alexander P. Kazhdan, “The 
Emperor’s New Clothes?” History Today 39:9 (Sept. 1989), 26-34. 
11 For a more recent use of Byzantium as a foil in contemporary debates, see the critique of a 
recent essay by Saba Mahmood in: Dimitris Krallis, “The Critic’s Byzantine Ploy: Voltairean 
Confusion in Postsecularist Narratives,” boundary 2 40:1 (2013). 
12 Ihor Ševčenko, “Constantinople as Viewed from the Eastern Provinces in the Middle Byzantine 
Period,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. ¾, Part 2. Eucharisterion: Essays presented to Omeljen 
Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students (1979-1980), 712-747. 
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the growth of urban centres in its hinterland following the loss of the Egyptian and Syrian 
provinces in the seventh century.13 The argument has been extended to include 
expressions of imperial authority. According to this view, the political power of the centre 
diminished substantially the moment one left the capital. Even in the empire’s core 
provinces, so the argument goes, the state footprint was restricted to the extraction of 
taxes and the preservation of the monopoly on sovereignty.14 A similar view has been 
made for the frontier regions of the empire.15 
This minimalist account, while important as a corrective to the image of the 
omnipotent and omnipresent Byzantine state, moves the pendulum too far in the other 
direction. While the enlightenment era caricature and its Soviet era reiteration outlined 
above is out of proportion, there is at least some basis for the re-examination of the role 
of the Byzantine state in society that focuses on its bureaucratic nature. The Diataxis of 
the eleventh-century judge and historian, Michael Attaleiates is illustrative of this 
tendency. The document, issued in 1077, contains the monastic rule for his almshouse 
in the city of Raidestos, located three days east from the Byzantine capital, and for the 
monastery of Christ Panoiktirmon in Constantinople itself. In addition to the details 
surrounding the daily lives of the monks and the administration of property, the 
document contains copies of two chrysoboulla from the emperors Michael VII Doukas 
(r.1071-1078) and Nikephoros III Botaneiates (r.1078-1081). The preambles are 
illustrative of the scope of the bureaucracy involved, and are worth quoting at length: 
Copy of the emperor, lord Michael [VII] Doukas, which was registered at the 
office of the genikos logothetes in the month of March of the thirteenth indiction, 
at the office of the oikeiaka on March 28 of the thirteenth indiction, at the office of 
the sakellei in the month of March of the thirteenth indiction, at the oikonomion of 
                                                     
13 Michael Angold, “The Shaping of the Byzantine ‘City’,” Byzantinische Forschungen 10 (1985), 
1-6. 
14 Leonora Neville, Authority in Byzantine Provincial Society, 950-1100 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
15 Eastern frontier: Jean-Claude Cheynet, “Les limites de pouvoir à Byzance: une forme de 
tolerance?” in Anochē Kai Katastolē Stous Mesous Chronous : Mnēmē Lenou Maurommatē 
(Toleration and Repression in the Middle Ages), ed. by K. Nikolau (Athens: Ethniko Hidryma 
Ereunōn, Institouto Vyzantinōn Ereunōn , 2002); Western frontier, and Italy in particular: 
Catherine Holmes, Basil II and the Governance of Empire (976-1025) (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 429-447. 
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pious institutions on March 30 of the thirteenth indiction, and at the office of the 
stratiotikos logothetes on April 14 of the thirteenth indiction.16 
The preamble to Botaneiates’ chrysoboullon is virtually identical and reveals the same 
level of bureaucratic proceduralism, as the document is deposited in the various 
offices.17 Additionally, the chrysoboulla set out to protect the properties from interference 
by “judges, fiscal agents, strateutai, orthotai, magistrates  registrars, tax collectors and 
all their subordinates… as if by a great fortress which is impregnable on all sides;” there 
are also provisions barring the billeting of soldiers.18 As a member of the imperial 
administration, Attaleiates would have been well informed of the possibilities for imperial 
interference in his foundations and the documents are a testament to the sheer scope 
for state intrusion and the extent of imperial authority.19 
The presence of the state and its apparatus was not just concentrated at the 
imperial centre, but also at the periphery and in Italy in particular. The cartulary evidence 
for the city of Bari, the administrative capital of Byzantine Italy, reveals a polity in 
constant contact with the imperial centre. The succession of emperors is dutifully 
recorded by the city’s annalists, as well as the sometimes dramatic circumstances 
surrounding their rise and fall. For instance the blinding of the emperor Romanos IV 
Diogenes (r.1068-1071) following the treachery at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 is 
recorded in detail in the Italian annals and chronicles.20 This should not be altogether 
surprising, given that Constantinople ensured that provincial outposts knew who held the 
imperium. The eleventh-century Hebrew Chronicle of Ahimaaz records on the death of 
the emperor Basileios II (r. 976-1025) that: “it was the custom of the emperors of 
Constantinople, whenever an emperor died, to make proclamation by letter, in Bari, 
                                                     
16 Attaleiates, Diataxis INV 10, p.361. 
17 Attaleiates, Diataxis INV 11, p.363. 
18 Attaleiates, Diataxis INV 10, p.361-362. These passages are repeated verbatim in Botaneiates’ 
chrysoboullon: Attaleiates, Diataxis INV 11, p.365-366. 
19 For the life of Attaleiates: Dimitris Krallis, Michael Attaleiates and the Politics of Imperial 
Decline in Eleventh-Century Byzantium. Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies Volume 
422: Medieval Confluence Series Volume 2 (Tempe, AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and 
Renaissance Studies, 2012), 1-42. 
20 Ann. Lupi. 177; Will. Apulia Book III, pp.29-31; Amatus I.12-13, p.48. In fact, William of Apulia 
interrupts his account of the siege of Bari in order to recount the events in question. 
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giving the day and time when he had passed.”21 The existence of local regnal lists only 
further underscores this trend.22 Byzantine Italy was therefore, firmly integrated into the 
communication networks of the day.23 
 There is also significant evidence for the presence of an extensive bureaucracy 
in the provinces. While this will be more fully expanded upon in Chapter 1, it is worth 
noting here that each city had its own representative of the imperial administration and 
that large centres, such as Bari and Reggio, boasted much larger bureaucracies. These 
were bureaucracies that the inhabitants of Byzantine Italy turned to when they sought to 
record land transfers and settle disputes.24 Moreover, the presence of the administrative 
structures was not passive; the penitent bringing a suit for judgement to the local 
bureaucrat needed to know not only which official to approach, but also the proper forms 
with which to present the suit. Understanding the terms of reference was therefore not 
neutral. It changed provincial society and implicated it in the Byzantine polity because it 
required accepting a discursive culture of petition and response, and the principles that 
underpinned it. In other words, agreeing to play by the rules of the game required the 
prima facie acceptance of the game.25 While it is true that much of the lower ranks of the 
bureaucracy were drawn from the local population, they were nonetheless absorbed into 
the imperial taxis, holding Byzantine ranks and titles, drawing salaries and otherwise 
acting within a Byzantine, bureaucratic, cultural milieu. It is significant that even the great 
                                                     
21 Chron. Ahimaaz 13b, p.85. 
22 Michael McCormick, “The Imperial Edge: Italo-Byzantine Identity, Movement and Integration, 
A.D. 650-950,” in Studies on the Internal Diaspora of the Byzantine Empire,” eds. Helene 
Ahrweiler and Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and 
Collection, 1998), 47. 
23 See McCormick, “The Imperial Edge,” 31-45. McCormick argues for the integration of the 
Italian periphery into the empire partly by charting the movement of people between the periphery 
and the centre.  This “kinetic integration,” as he calls it, served to further integrate Byzantine Italy 
into the empire.  
24 Rosemary Morris, “Dispute Settlement in the Byzantine Provinces in the Tenth Century,” in The 
Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe, eds. Paul Fouracre and Wendy Davies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 125–147. See also: Patricia Skinner, “Urban 
Life in Apulia in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” Papers of the British School at Rome 66 
(1998), 159-176. 
25 See Ando, who notes in Late Antique disputes over a community’s responsibilities for road 
maintenance: “a bureau of roads was required to talk to a bureau of roads.” Clifford Ando, “The 
ambitions of government: Territoriality and infrastructural power in ancient Rome,” (Paper 
presented at The Center for Historical Research, Ohio State University, on 31 January, 2014), 31. 
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rebel Melos the Lombard, who twice rose against Byzantine rule during the first two 
decades of the eleventh century, was described as being “clad in the Greek manner.”26 
Moreover, the ease with which the Lombard patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos and the 
Calabrian disciple of Michael Psellos, Ioannes Italos transitioned from the Italian 
periphery to the Constantinopolitan centre further demonstrates this phenomenon.27 
Byzantine culture had a powerful draw, which endured even after the end of imperial rule 
in the Mezzogiorno, as can be seen in the many charters that continued to date 
according to Roman tax indictions and the rule of Byzantine emperors, well into the 
Norman era.28 Ultimately, Byzantine rule and the bureaucratic structures that 
accompanied it had a profound effect on the region which persisted and penetrated local 
modes of thought.29 
Furthermore, the identity that provincials accessed was one that celebrated their 
connection to the Old Rome of Romulus and Remus. A fact frequently overlooked, 
carefully avoided or simply ignored in studies of Byzantium, is that the Byzantines did 
not call themselves ‘Byzantines’, instead calling themselves ‘Romans’. The people that 
inhabited what we call today the Byzantine Empire, and what they called Romanía, saw 
themselves as direct descendants and inheritors of Old Rome and the political traditions 
that were associated with it. Their state was the res publica, or politeia, whose legitimacy 
                                                     
26 Will. Apulia Book I, p.3. 
27 Nicholas I Mystikos: Alexander Kazhdan, s.v. " Nicholas I Mystikos." In ODB: Oxford University 
Press, 1991; Ioannes Italos: Alexander Kazhdan, s.v. "John Italos." In ODB: Oxford University 
Press, 1991. See also: McCormick, “Imperial Edge,” 39-45, who in addition to Mystikos and Italos 
also notes the rise of Ioannicius of Ravenna from bilingual secretary for the exarch, to palace 
official of Justinian II in addition to the prelates of Syracuse, Theodore and Gregory Asbestas. 
28 For example, private charters in the Apulian city of Trani dropped any reference to their 
Norman overlords after the 1080s and returned to the Byzantine practice of dating: Paul Oldfield, 
“Urban Government in Southern Italy, c. 1085-1127,” English Historical Review CXXII, 497 
(2007): 592. On the enduring Byzantine influence more generally, see the discussion in: Jean-
Marie Martin, “L'empreinte de Byzance dans l'Italie normande. Occupation du sol et institutions,” 
Annales 60 (2005), 733-766. 
29 See also Woolf, who charts the Romanization of another province, Gaul. Greg Woolf, 
Becoming Roman: the origins of provincial civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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was based on the consent of the people.30 New research has shown that maintaining the 
good opinion of the citizens of the empire was crucial for securing one’s place on the 
throne.31 Each citizen of the empire saw themselves as a political agent with an 
important role to play as legitimizer of his ruler, a role that was not challenged by the 
surviving sources. In other words, political power flowed upwards from the people, and 
not downwards from the emperor as has been hitherto argued: the emperor was the 
servant of the people, not the other way around.32 The picture that begins to emerge 
here is that the image of Byzantium as a multiethnic empire, with a divinely appointed 
emperor that held unquestioned sway over the population, must give way to the 
possibility of a pre-modern national community called ‘Romanía’ that was served by an 
emperor and state apparatus that was based on a common Roman, republican, 
heritage. 
This thesis, however, does not attempt to definitively address the still new and 
perhaps controversial question of a Byzantine nation state. Rather, it takes a small step 
in that direction through a case study of Byzantine Italy during the eleventh-century 
                                                     
30 Anthony Kaldellis, “From Rome to New Rome, from Empire to Nation-State: Reopening the 
Question of Byzantium’s Roman Identity,” in Two Romes: Rome and Constantinople in Late 
Antiquity, eds. Lucy Grig and Gavin Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 387-404. 
Idem., Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the 
Classical Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42-119. 
31 See especially: Anthony Kaldellis, “How to usurp the throne in Byzantium: The role of public 
opinion in sedition and rebellion,” in Power and subversion in Byzantium: papers from the 43rd 
Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham, March 2010, eds Dimiter Angelov and 
Michael Saxby (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 43-56. But also Krallis on this republicanism in action 
in Attaleiates’ History: Dimitris Krallis, “‘Democratic’ Action in Eleventh-Century Byzantium: 
Michael Attaleiates’s ‘Republicanism’ in Context,” Viator 40, no. 2 (2009). See also Morris who 
looks at the efforts of the emperor Ioannes Tzimiskes to scrub his image following his murder of 
his predecessor: Rosemary Morris, “Succession and Usurpation: Politics and Rhetoric in the Late 
tenth century,” in New Constantines. The rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th 
Centuries. Papers from the Twenty-Sixth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, ed. Paul 
Magdalino (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1994). See Krsmanović for the creation of a dynastically valid 
public image by the emperors Basil I and Nikephoros III Botaneiates: Bojana Krsmanović, 
“Legendary genealogies of Byzantine Emperors and Their Families,” Zbornik radova 
Vizantoloskog Instituta 41 (2004), 71-98. 
32 Compare the Arab view of Heraclius whose status as an ideal ruler who is compassionate to 
his subjects, is used to add legitimacy to the then new prophet, Mohammed: Nadia Maria El-
Cheikh, “Muḥammad and Heraclius: A Study in Legitimacy,” Studia Islamica 89 (1999): 5-21, esp. 
8-9. Another key aspect of this legitimacy was the strength of the emperor, rather than dynastic 
considerations: Idem. Byzantium Viewed by the Arabs. Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs 
XXXVI (Cambridge: Distributed for The Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University 
by Harvard University Press, 2004), 88-89. 
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Norman Conquest. Byzantine subjects of the Mezzogiorno saw themselves as political 
agents, informed perhaps by the political role of their Latin, Roman forbearers. This 
political agency and attendant urban autonomy manifested themselves in a variety of 
different ways, depending on the particular circumstances. As such the terms are 
applied to a broad range of activities: self-expression, self-definition, independent 
decision making, and even self-rule can all serve as signifiers of political agency and 
urban autonomy. However, what did this political agency and urban autonomy look like? 
Moreover, what implications does this have for conceptions of imperial authority on the 
western periphery? In the process of answering these questions, this thesis will reveal 
that political agency and urban autonomy were alive and well in Byzantium’s 
westernmost province and further that they manifested in a variety of different ways. The 
emerging vibrant Italian urban body politic suggests that our conceptions of imperial 
authority will need to be revised in order to take into account the political role that 
Byzantine citizens occupied.  
The eleventh century forms the scope of this inquiry for a number of different 
reasons. On the one hand, the arrival of the Normans in the region during the early 
decades of the eleventh century and their subsequent conquest of Byzantine territories 
provides an excellent opportunity to study urban political agency as city after city sought 
to navigate the transition to Norman rule with as much autonomy as possible. Moreover, 
the eleventh century marked the political and military apogee of Byzantine power in the 
Italian peninsula. Therefore, penetration of administrative structures would have been at 
their most extensive, as would the consequent effects on indigenous political modes of 
thought. Furthermore, this period encompassed a high point of economic expansion that 
created a foundation for political agency as newly prosperous classes gained access to 
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the corridors of power for the first time, and the political agency that that access 
entailed.33  
The political agency that manifested itself during the eleventh-century transition 
from Byzantine to Norman rule has been hitherto ignored by scholars. Indeed, according 
to one important historian of southern Italy, byzantinists have remained relatively mute 
on what has been anachronistically called the ‘Katepanate of Italy’.34 The Adriatic Sea 
has proven to be a greater barrier to modern-day historians, than it ever was to the 
Byzantines themselves. While this is not altogether surprising from a disciplinary 
perspective, given the different language requirements involved in the study of this 
region’s history, there have nonetheless been two important exceptions: André Guillou 
and Vera von Falkenhausen have written extensively on the administrative structure, 
culture, and society of Byzantine Italy in a number of seminal articles and monographs. 
Their work, however, has often treated the region in isolation from the rest of the 
empire.35 Moreover, when it sought to integrate Italy into imperial structures, the 
                                                     
33 For economic growth see: Alan Harvey, Economic expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900-
1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); For agricultural growth see: John Haldon, 
“’Cappadocia will be given over to ruin and become a desert.’ Environmental evidence for 
historically-attested events in the 7th-10th centuries,” Byzantina Mediterranea: Festschrift für 
Johannes Koder zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Ewald Kislinger (Wien: Böhlau, 2007), 215-230; For the 
scientific presentation of this data see: Ann England, et al., “Landscape Change in Cappadocia 
(central Turkey): a Palaeoecological Investigation of Annually Laminated Sediments from Nar 
Lake,” The Holocene 18, no. 8 (2008), 1229–1245; For demographic growth see: Gilbert Dagron, 
“The Urban Economy, Seventh-Twelfth Centuries,” in The Economic History of Byzantium: from 
the seventh through the fifteenth century, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, et al. (Washington, D.C.: 
Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2002),1: 401-403; Merchants and tradesmen 
were first admitted into the Senate during the second half of the eleventh century: Dagron, “The 
Urban Economy,” 1:415. 
34 On the silence of byzantinists: André Guillou, “Notes sur la socièté dans le katépanat d’Italie au 
XIe siècle,” in Studies on Byzantine Italy. Collected Studies Series 3 (London: Variorum Reprints, 
1970), 439. The ‘Katepanate of Italy’ corresponded to the collective of Byzantine territories in 
southern Italy. On the use of the term ‘Katepanate’ see: Alexander Kazhdan, s.v. "Katepanate." In 
ODB: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
35 See especially the articles collected in André Guillou, Studies on Byzantine Italy, Collected 
Studies Series 3 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1970). See also the classic study by Vera von 
Falkenhausen, Untersuchungen über die byzantinische Herrschaft in Süditalien vom 9. bis ins 11. 
Jahrhundert. Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte des östlichen Europa 1. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
1967; and the same in Italian idem, La dominazione bizantina nell'Italia meridionale dal IX all'XI 
secolo (Bari: Ecumenica Editrice, 1978). 
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discussion remained in the realm of high politics, losing sight of life on the ground.36 
More recently, important work has been done by byzantinists Jean-Marie Martin and 
Ghilsane Noyé, and medieval italianists G.A. Loud and Barbara M. Kreutz, which while 
truly valuable as general studies, has not sought to specifically interrogate urban political 
life.37 
The closest attempt to answer such questions about southern Italy has come 
from Paul Oldfield. His work, however, focuses on the post-Norman reality given that he 
sees the Norman invasion as a catalyst for urban autonomy.38 According to Oldfield, the 
period following the death of Robert Guiscard in 1085 “saw a general weakening of 
central authority in the South Italian peninsula from which emerged a variety of urban 
governments structured by local influences and with differing levels of popular 
participation.”39 Here, I argue that the popular participation that he identifies, at least in 
formerly Byzantine territory, had its roots in an earlier period. Indeed, at the very least 
the repeated rebellions against different aspects of Byzantine policy and rule that 
occurred in the lead-up to the Norman Conquest are suggestive of a certain degree of 
local autonomy and call for further investigation of what may have been interesting 
Italian, but at same time Byzantine outbursts of political activity.40 
This political activity, and the agency for which it is a mirror, can be found 
throughout the sources available to the historian of Byzantine Italy, which are fortunately 
                                                     
36 For example: Vera von Falkenhausen, “Between Two Empires: Byzantine Italy in the Reign of 
Basil II,” in Byzantium in the Year 1000, edited by Paul Magdalino (Leiden: Brill Academic 
Publishers, 2003), passim. Historical agency rests in the hands of emperors, princes, popes and 
so on, while local populations, though acknowledged are driven along by events. 
37 For example: Jean-Marie Martin, La Pouille du VIe au XIIe siècle. (Rome: Ecole française de 
Rome, 1993). Barbara M. Kreutz, Before the Normans: Southern Italy in the ninth and tenth 
centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1991); Idem. and Ghislaine Noyé. “Les 
campagnes de l’Italie méridionale byzantine (Xe-XIe siècles). Mélanges de l'Ecole française de 
Rome. Moyen-Age, Temps modernes 101, no. 2 (1989): 559-596; G.A. Loud, The Age of Robert 
Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 
2000). 
38 Paul Oldfield, City and Community in Norman Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
39 Paul Oldfield, “Urban Government in Southern Italy, c. 1085-1127,” 607. 
40 Jean-Claude Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations à Byzance 963-1210 (Paris: Publ. de la 
Sorbonne, 1990), 21, 30, 35, 53, 57-58, 63. 
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more numerous and extensive than for any other province of the empire.41 Nonetheless, 
despite the widespread availability of these sources, they have remained hitherto 
untapped as sources of political agency and urban autonomy. Bari, the centre of 
Byzantine imperial power in Italy, and the province of Apulia in general, are particularly 
well served by the extant annals, namely the Annales Barenses, the Annales Lupi 
Protospatharii, and the Anonymi Barensis Chronicon. These sources collectively provide 
otherwise unattested details for the tenth and eleventh centuries and are especially 
valuable for an accounting of the provincial Byzantine administration and other local 
notables. Moreover, the arrival of the Normans in the eleventh century occasioned the 
creation of a number of narrative works celebrating their conquest of the region. William 
of Apulia and the monks Amatus of Montecassino and Gaufredo Malaterra each wrote 
contemporary accounts of the rather eventful entry of the Normans into southern Italy 
during the eleventh century.42 While the focus of these works is on the Norman 
leadership, with Robert Guiscard and the Hauteville clan figuring prominently, there 
nonetheless emerges a detailed picture of the region as it is being conquered. The 
twelfth-century consolidation of Norman rule, and the resistance that it engendered, are 
covered in the chronicles by Alexander of Telese and more critically by Hugo Falcandus. 
Additionally, the charters contained in the Codice diplomatica barese series provide a 
fine-grained look at Byzantine provincial administration in action. The western sources 
are rounded out by Erchembert’s History of the Lombards, which records the first 
tentative steps of the Byzantine reconquest of Italy in the ninth century and the 
Chronicon Salernitanum which provides details on the establishment of the office of the 
katepano in the tenth century. Lastly, the Life of St. Nilos of Rossano details a number of 
moments of resistance to imperial rule, while the account of the translation of the relics 
of Saint Nicholas of Myra contributes to the picture of Bari as home to an autonomous 
polity.   
                                                     
41 Vera von Falkenhausen, “The South Italian Sources,” in Byzantines and Crusaders in non-
Greek Sources, 1025-1204, edited by Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 95-
99. 
42 For an introductory discussion of these historians see: K.B. Wolf, Making history: the Normans 
and their historians in eleventh-century Italy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1995). 87-171. While the bibliographical information on William of Apulia is meagre at best, some 
have noted a possible pro-Byzantine bias: Paul Brown, “The Gesta Roberti Wiscardi: A 
‘Byzantine’ history?” Journal of Medieval History 37, 2 (2011), 162-179. 
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While the Italian provinces do not appear to have been a subject of central 
concern for Byzantine historians writing from the heartland of the empire, there is 
nonetheless material of value to be found within eastern sources in Greek. For instance, 
while the Synopsis Historión of Ioannes Skylitzes only mentions Italy four times, the work 
nonetheless provides important context for events on the western periphery.43 Of similar 
value are the Chronographia of Michael Psellos, the Historia of Michael Attaleiates, and 
the Strategikon of Kekaumenos, while the writings of Niketas Choniates and Ioannes 
Kinnamos extend this context into the twelfth century. The Alexiad of Anna Komnene, on 
the other hand, contains a great deal of detail on the Duke Robert Guiscard and his 
Norman compatriots, who are so important to the history of southern Italy. The 
comparative perspective of the eastern periphery and Antioch in particular are provided 
by Yaḥyā of Antioch and Nikephoros Bryennios. Lastly, small but crucial details on the 
role of the Italian provinces within the empire can be found in the Taktikon Escorial, a 
tenth-century list of court precedence, as well as the De Administrando Imperio and the 
De Ceremoniis, two manuals commissioned by the emperor Constantine VII 
Porphrygenetos (r.945-957) on foreign policy and court ceremony, respectively.44  
This thesis begins in the sixth century with the Lombard invasion of the Italian 
peninsula, and lays out the historical context for the Norman Conquest at the close of 
the eleventh century. Chapter 1 records the resurgence of imperial power in southern 
Italy, following the course of sixth-century Lombard invasions and ninth-century Arab 
raids, and brings the story to the turn of the millennium, before turning to an analysis of 
the people and government of Byzantine Italy. Ultimately, this excursus will provide the 
foundation and context for discussions of autonomy and the administrative structures in 
which it functions. Chapter 2 examines the response of cities to the Norman Conquest, 
tracing a peculiarly urban political consciousness in the lands of the katepano. Chapter 3 
takes a closer look at the city of Bari, and the role of factionalism in urban government 
during the final Norman siege of the Byzantine capital, before turning to an in depth look 
at the translation of the relics of St. Nicholas of Myra and the urban political autonomy 
and sense of collective identity that this episode exemplifies. Lastly, the Conclusion 
                                                     
43 Falkenhausen, “Between Two Empires,” 137-8. 
44 Please see the Bibliography for complete details of primary sources, which are omitted here for 
reasons of space. 
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brings into focus these findings and provides an outline of the Byzantine Italian urban 
polity and its significance both in and of itself and in the context of Byzantine studies. 
Within several years of the 1156 destruction of Bari by the Sicilian King, William I 
‘the Bad’ there is evidence of the beginnings of repopulation.45 The cathedral of St. 
Nicholas, which was spared the city’s fate, formed the nucleus for the resettlement as 
the Baresi returned to their homes. Despite being scattered throughout the region, there 
existed enough of a corporate civic identity among former inhabitants to undergird the 
refounding of the city.46 This civic identity and the attendant quest for urban political 
autonomy that flowed from it, forms the subject of what follows. 
  
                                                     
45 CDB V, 117. 
46 For a former Baresi living in the nearby city of Giovinazzo see: CDB V, 114. Compare also the 
implicit corporate identity of Byzantine refugees that fled the seventh-century Persian conquest of 
the Roman Near East. The refugees did not represent a cross-section of Byzantine society, but 
those who stood to lose under the new leaders, especially Chalcedonian Christians that arrived in 
Alexandria. See: Clive Foss, “The Persians in the Roman near East (602-630 AD),” Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series 13:2 (July  2003), 149-170. 
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Figure 1: Map of Southern Italy47 
                                                     
47 Map adapted by the author from: “Map of Italia meridionale.svg,” Wikicommons, accessed 14 
April, 2014, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Italia_meridionale.svg. With 
reference to: Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 309, Map 1; Holmes, Basil II and the 
Governance of Empire, 431, Map 4. 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Room to Manoeuver: Provincial Administration 
and the Limits of Imperial Authority 
We think that Catepan means, in Greek, ‘before all’. Whoever holds that office 
among the Greeks acts as the people’s governor, arranging everything and 
dealing ‘before all’ with each person as they deserve.48 
William of Apulia, the eleventh-century chronicler of the Norman Duke, Robert 
Guiscard, recognized the katepano as the emperor’s man on the ground in the 
Mezzogiorno. However, the picture is more complicated than that. William’s etymology 
reveals a mode of rule that was based on merit and justice. Instead of a proconsular 
model of arbitrary rule, Byzantine Italian subjects could expect to be dealt with justly, and 
have their issues dealt with on their merit.49 What follows is an analysis of Byzantine rule 
and imperial authority in southern Italy and the administrative structures that 
underpinned it. Before proceeding, however, an exposition of the political and historical 
context of the Byzantine presence in the region is presented, taking the story from the 
sixth century to the eve of the Norman Conquest around the turn of the millennium, 
thereby charting the resurgence of imperial authority in the region. Thereafter a fine 
grained look at the economic, demographic and social situation of the region is provided 
before turning to an examination of Byzantine administrative structures and the realities 
of imperial authority on the western periphery. This historical, economic, and social 
context will provide the foundations for discussions of political agency and urban 
autonomy that will follow in subsequent chapters. Ultimately, the realities of Byzantine 
provincial administration created the space for the political agency and urban autonomy 
that forms the subject of this thesis. What this chapter will reveal is a prosperous yet 
                                                     
48 Will. Apulia Book I, p.5. This passage is taken by Brown as evidence of William of Apulia’s 
possible Greek heritage. See Brown, “The Gesta Roberti Wiscardi: A ‘Byzantine’ history?” 168-
169. 
49 For an eleventh-century articulation and definition of justice, see: Attaleiates, Ponema Nomikon 
 17 
restive region, conscious of its political agency and governed with an eye to the 
pragmatic by the Byzantine katepanoi sent to from Constantinople. 
The Lombard invasion of the Italian peninsula of 568 had, by the eighth century, 
reduced the Byzantines to central and southern Calabria, the very tip of the Salento 
peninsula (i.e. the ‘heel’ of Italy) and Sicily. Despite determined Byzantine resistance, 
everything north of Otranto in Apulia, and all of northern Calabria were taken by the 
Lombards. The Italian peninsula was divided politically between a Lombard kingdom in 
the north, the duchy of Spoleto in the centre and the duchy of Benevento in the south. 
The northern kingdom fell to Charlemagne and his Franks in 774, with the duchy of 
Spoleto following soon afterwards in 776, however, the southern duchy of Benevento 
was able to retain its independence. The fact that the Lombards never conquered Rome 
and its environs, and thus never had access to the easiest route south, may have been 
an important factor here.50 A period of relative stability endured until the Islamic invasion 
of Sicily in 827, occasioned by the revolt of a disaffected Byzantine tourmarch named 
Euphemios.51 The conquest of Sicily was largely completed by 902 with the fall of 
Taormina, however, Byzantine power was not totally extinguished on the island until the 
fall of the last remaining fortress of Rametta in 963/5.52 The island would serve as a 
base for Muslim raids on southern Italy. A short-lived emirate established in Bari in 847 
following the treachery of Muslim mercenaries hired by the local commander only 
increased the devastation.53 Concurrently, the duchy of Benevento descended into civil 
war and the region split into rival duchies based in Benevento, Salerno and later Capua; 
the use of Muslim mercenaries only deepened the chaos. Bari was eventually retaken by 
                                                     
50 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 14-15. 
51 For the primary account see: Skylitzes III.20-21, pp. 48-50. Fearing disfigurement, Euphemios 
rebelled and invited an Arab army to Sicily on the condition that he be made basileus of the 
island. On his imperial aspirations see: Vivien Prigent, “La carrière du tourmarque Euphèmios, 
basileus des Romains,” in Histoire et culture dans l’Italie byzantine, ed. André Jacob et al. 
Collection de l’Ecole française de Rome 393 (Rome: L’Ecole française de Rome, 2006), 279-317. 
52 Giovanni Uggeri, “I castra Bizantini in Sicilia,” in Histoire et culture dans l’Italie byzantine, ed. 
André Jacob et al. Collection de l’Ecole française de Rome 393 (Rome: L’Ecole française de 
Rome, 2006), 334. The Byzantine sources detail the failed campaign of the patrikios Manuel 
Phokas to relieve the Arab siege of Rametta: Skylitzes XIV.9, p. 256; Leo the Deacon IV.7-8, pp. 
115-117. Manuel was beheaded by his Muslim captors: Liudprand, Relatio 44, p. 265. 
53 Pando, the local commander, was later tortured and possibly drowned by the locals for his 
troubles: Erchempert 16, pp. 145-6. The standard work for the emirate remains: Giosuè Musca, 
L’emirato di Bari 847-871. Nuova biblioteca Dedalo 138 (Bari: Dedalo, 1992). 
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a Frankish expedition led by Louis II in 871 and reintegrated into the principality of 
Benevento.54 In 876, Bari was turned over to the Byzantine commander of Otranto, the 
strategos Gregory, by the Lombard garrison there, reportedly out of fear of Muslim 
raids.55 The city would serve as the nucleus for the resurgence of Byzantine power in 
Apulia, resulting in the short-lived conquest of the city of Benevento in 891.56  
Muslim raids continued throughout the tenth century, but would never again 
threaten to establish permanent footholds on the mainland.57 This was occasioned as 
much by the series of treaties between the rulers of Sicily, their Fatimid overlords and 
the Byzantine emperors, as by internal divisions within the Muslim polity during the early 
decades of the century.58 Meanwhile, the division of Lombard power in the south had 
settled into a showdown between Benevento-Capua and Salerno. This disunity meant 
that the Byzantine presence would only suffer minor setbacks from that quarter.59 Efforts 
by the Holy Roman Emperors Otto I and his son Otto II were equally ineffectual, even 
though Otto II did invade Apulia as far south as Bari, which he briefly besieged “with no 
results.”60 Raids from Sicily would resume in earnest in 976, with a serious attack 
occurring on the outskirts of Bari in 988 that “depopulated the suburbs.” Matera was 
sacked in 994 after a four month siege.61 However, while these attacks were serious 
                                                     
54 Ann. Lupi 37. Louis II was led to understand that despite his help, his presence in southern Italy 
was not welcome. The prince of Benevento took him prisoner and extracted a promise that he 
never return to the city in exchange for his release. For this episode see: Loud, The Age of 
Robert Guiscard, 18. 
55 Ann. Lupi. 38. Erchempert 38, 186-187. Gregory also held the rank of baioulos. See also: Vera 
von Falkenhausen, “Bari bizantina: profilo di un capoluogo di provincia (secoli IX-XI),” in Spazio, 
società, potere nell'Italia dei comuni, ed. Gabriella Rossetti. Europa mediterranea 1 (Naples: 
Liguori, 1986), 198. 
56 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 15-19. Falkenhausen draws the useful comparison 
between Bari and Ani as centres of Byzantine expansion. Falkenhausen, “Bari bizantina,” 198. 
57 The last Muslim foothold was dispatched in 915. See: Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 20.  
58 Ibid., 20-21. Ann. Lupi 50: “the Agarenes evacuated Garigliano.” 
59 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 23. 
60 Ibid., 23-4; Ann. Lupi 74. 
61 Ann. Lupi 90, 96. 
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enough to warrant attention from the imperial centre, they did not constitute existential 
threats to Byzantine authority.62 
In fact, the greatest challenge to Byzantine power during the tenth century was 
not external, but internal, as the inhabitants of southern Italy registered their displeasure 
in a number of revolts. Muslim raids, and in particular the failure of the Byzantine 
provincial administration to protect the population from them, led to increased dissention 
among the people. In 965-966, following the debacle of Manual Phokas’ failed invasion 
of Sicily, the people of Rossano rose in revolt in the face of requests by the magistros 
Nikephoros Hexakionites to build ships and man them; led by the protospatharios 
Gregorios Maleinos, a member of one of the leading local families, they burned the ships 
and killed their captains.63 Similarly, in the early 980s parts of Apulia rose in revolt in 
response to increased financial exactions; the patrikios Kalokyros Dephinas had to 
intervene militarily against the city of Ascoli.64 While these two events were local affairs 
and thus not in and of themselves a great danger to the Byzantine presence in southern 
Italy, they are nevertheless indicative of the importance of local power centres and the 
presence of political agency. The need of the Byzantine administration to draw their 
resources directly from the population meant that taxation could and did fall more heavily 
                                                     
62 Nikephoros II Phokas sent an expeditions to recapture Sicily during in 964 or 965 [Skylitzes 
XIV.9, p.256; Leo the Deacon IV.7-8, pp.115-117], while Basil II was planning his own expedition 
before he died in 1025 [Ann. Bari. 17; Skylitzes XVIII.47, p.348] and Georgios Maniakes was 
dispatched in the summer of 1038 by Michael IV: Psellos, Chr. VI 76-89, pp.192-199 ; Skylitzes 
XIX.16, p.380; Attaleiates, Hist. III.1, pp.10-13; Will. Apulia Book I, pp.7-8; Malaterra I.7-8, pp. 6-
7; Amatus II.8-10, 14-15, pp.66-69; Ann. Lupi. 138; Anon. Bar. 148. 
63 For the primary account see: Vita S. Nilos §10, pp.84-89; See also the summaries in: Vera von 
Falkenhausen, “A Provincial Aristocracy: The Byzantine Provinces in Southern Italy (9th-11th 
Century),” in The Byzantine Aristocracy: IX – XIII Centuries, ed. Michael Angold. BAR 
International Series 221 (Oxford: BAR, 1984), 224; Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, 21; 
Telemachos Lounghis, “La révolte à Rossano de Calabre l’an 965,” in Byzantina Europaea. 
Ksiega jubileuszowa ofiarowa profesorowi Waldemarowi Ceranowi, eds. Maciej Kokoszko and 
Miroslaw Jerzy Leszka. Byzantina Lodziensia 11 (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 
2007), 367-375; Following the intervention of St. Nilos, the Rossani were pardoned, having only 
to provide financial compensation for the damage done. There is no evidence to support the 
identification of this Calabrian family of Maleinos, with the Maleinos family of Asia Minor, though it 
cannot be discounted: Falkenhausen, La dominazione bizantina, 154. 
64 Ann. Lupi. 85-6; Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, 30. Fortunately, Bari, which had also 
rebelled, was betrayed to the patrikios by two brothers, Sergio and Teofilatto. 
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on citizens of Byzantine Italy, than in other parts of the empire.65 Even when resources 
went directly to self-defence, as in Rossano where local levies went to ships for defence 
against Arab raids, or in the above cited Apulian example, where funds bolstered 
defences against Frankish incursions, local residents frequently protested, sometimes 
violently.66 When in the eleventh century, revolts grew more severe, for instance during 
the twin rebellions of the Lombard Melos, Byzantine provincial authorities were able to 
suppress them, though with some effort, and  the chaos engendered made the conquest 
of southern Italy that much easier for numerically inferior Norman invaders.67 
On the eve of the eleventh-century Norman Conquest, southern Italy was thus a 
politically fragmented place while Sicily had passed completely over to Muslim control. 
By the time the Normans landed on the island in the late eleventh century, only a small 
orthodox Christian community based in the Val Demone remained and they are attested 
paying the jizyah or head tax.68 On the mainland, however, the Byzantines had extended 
their control northward and consolidated their hold on Apulia and Calabria. In Campania, 
the Lombards had once again splintered into three separate principalities based around 
Benevento, Capua and Salerno. On the west coast, the cities of Amalfi, Gaeta and 
Naples were effectively independent, despite acknowledging nominal suzerainty of the 
Byzantines.  The population over whom the Byzantines claimed dominion was restive, 
due not only to the precarious security situation brought on by Muslim raids and 
Lombard and Frankish invasions, but also due to the financial demands placed upon 
                                                     
65 DAC II.50, p.697: “the strategoi of the West were not paid a salary since they received from 
their own themes their customary payment each year.” In the east, salaries or roga, were 
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d'Etat au Xe-XIe siècle,” in Le monde de Byzance. Histoire et institutions. Variorum Collected 
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on an indirect basis. See: Jean-Marie Martin, “Les thèmes Italiens: territoire, administration, 
population,” in Histoire et culture dans l’Italie byzantine, ed. André Jacob, et al. Collection de 
l’Ecole française de Rome 393 (Rome: L’Ecole française de Rome, 2006), 545-6. 
66 The Baresi annals reveal a steady bloodbath of local officials. Ann. Bar. 19 (a krites). Ann. Lupi. 
89 (a protospatharios), 92 (two exkoubitoi), 97 (another exkoubitos), 135 (a krites).  
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Pouvoir et contestations, 35.  
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the discussion in: Loud, the Age of Robert Guiscard, 151-3. 
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them to deal with these threats. However, that such restiveness, and the urban 
autonomy for which it becomes a mirror, was possible at all speaks to the nature of a 
provincial administration that, however unwillingly, allowed expressions of dissent to 
occur.  
The provincial administration of southern Italy, like other areas of the empire, was 
organized according to the theme system. This form of militarized provincial 
administration grew out of the crisis of the seventh century and evolved over time, 
adjusting over the years to accommodate the changing situation on the ground.69 In 
Italy, by the eleventh century, there were three themes: Longobardia in the east, based 
around the city of Bari, Calabria in the west, based around Reggio, and a smaller theme 
in the northwest of Byzantine territory called Lucania. This last provincial division was 
only a recent foundation, coinciding with the resurgence of Byzantine power in the region 
during the tenth century.70 Administrative arrangements mirrored physical realities: 
Longobardia was made up of plains and low plateaus, while Calabria and Lucania were 
generally mountainous.71 On a further demographic level, Longobardia was in the main 
populated by Latin speakers, who followed the western catholic rite and were judged 
according to Lombard Law. Calabria and Lucania, on the other hand, were mainly 
hellenophone, followed the eastern orthodox rite, and were under the jurisdiction of 
Byzantine law.72 While there were of course exceptions, for instance Bari had a great 
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deal of bilingual residents reflecting its role as a provincial capital, these generalizations 
held generally throughout the region.73 
Economically speaking, contrary to the contemporary image of the Mezzogiorno 
as a poor and backwards place, the region on the eve of the Norman invasion was on 
the rise, and by the standards of the day, prosperous.74 Despite the need of the 
provincial administration to support itself on local tax revenues, the Italian themes had 
historically been net contributors to the imperial fisc. The De Administrando Imperii 
records that “they used to remit annually to the emperor the sums due to the treasury.”75 
The eleventh-century historian and judge, Michael Attaleiates, speaking about Sicily and 
its loss to the Arabs in particular, reported that it was “a place so large, famous, 
endowed with the greatest cities along its coasts, and lacking in no resource.”76 In 
Calabria, there is evidence of extensive viticulture; the Vita of St. Nilos of Rossano 
records an episode that occurred in c.1004, where the saint led his fellow monks in 
cutting down vines surplus to their needs: “they cut from morning until the third hour.”77 
Moreover, a brebion, essentially a tax roll, dated to c.1050 in the Calabrian capital of 
Reggio, notes the presence of significant numbers of mulberry trees, an essential 
requirement for the production of silk. There is indirect evidence for lesser numbers in 
Longobardia.78 Similarly, archaeological surveys in the Salento peninsula reveal growing 
rural settlements, coinciding with the turn of the millennium, while excavations at the port 
of Otranto expose a city fully engaged in the Mediterranean economy.79 Even recent 
foundations such as Troia in northern Apulia, established in 1019, were flourishing by 
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74 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 48. 
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the late-eleventh century.80 While the waves of city building undertaken by the Byzantine 
provincial administration during this period can be largely attributed to defensive 
measures, the number of foundations points at the very least to an increase in the 
population.81 Lastly, discoveries of numerous issues of bronze folleis reveal an 
increasingly monetized society that, unique to Western Europe during this period was 
minting its own gold coin, the tarì, at Amalfi.82 Thus, despite the instability caused by 
continuing Arab raids, the Mezzogiorno at the turn of the millennium was characterized 
by a growing prosperity. 
Byzantine provincial administration was based on the city. A fortified city or town, 
called a kastron (κάστρον) or asti (ἄστυ), or in more peripheral areas, called a kastellion 
(καστέλλιον), formed the nucleus of a given territory.83 Villages and their territories were 
called chorion (χωρίον) and were delimitated by the imperial administration; these 
territories formed the basis of not only sub-thematic administration, but also taxation.84 
We know for instance, the precise delimitations (synora) of Troia, discussed above; the 
foundation document traces a detailed circuit that encompasses an area that was 45 km 
at its longest.85 Similar details are also known for Tricarico in the Basilicate.86 As was the 
case throughout the empire, taxation in Byzantine Italy was assessed collectively upon 
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each settlement and as such its payment was the collective responsibility of its 
residents. In August of 1016, Kinnomos the kalligraphos remitted thirty-six nomismata to 
the then katepano Basil Mesardonites in Bari, on behalf of the kastellion of Pelagiano 
near Taranto; the receipt for which is still extant.87 Making the collection and remittance 
of taxes to the imperial fisc a collective responsibility would have, on the one hand, 
made things more efficient for the provincial administration, but may also have provided 
a foundation for the collective political action to be considered below.88 
While this administrative schema may suggest a great deal of homogeneity 
within southern Italy, the reality on the ground was one of diversity. As noted above, the 
region was divided by rite and by language, however, the differences extended into 
demography and the attendant social structures of the region. In terms of demographics, 
Byzantine southern Italy can be divided into three different regions: the ancient Greek 
zone of central and southern Calabria; a densely populated Lombard area in central 
Apulia and the newly colonized (and reconquered) zones in the Capitanata, Lucania and 
northern Calabria.89 The human geography of central and southern Calabria at the 
beginning of the eleventh century reflected its historical exposure to the tenth century 
Arab raids; those settlements that remained were the least exposed and as such the 
oldest, and richest. Cities were walled; villages were typically nucleated and unwalled, 
usually situated on a hill or terrace and sometimes protected by a tower.90 Lombard 
Apulia on the other hand was marked by the high concentration of people in large 
agglomerations of kastra and choria, usually unfortified. However, while the less 
mountainous nature of the area probably facilitated the spread of settlements, they were 
nonetheless constrained by their dependence on well water.91 Newly colonized areas on 
the other hand reflected their status as peripheral zones. Except for a few larger centres, 
the population was diffuse, often living in small choria centred on a lone church. In 
contrast to central and northern Italy where rural populations clustered into fortified 
                                                     
87 Trinchera 16; Guillou, “Des collectivités rurales,” 320. 
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settlements independently, in the Mezzogiorno the phenomenon of incastellamento was 
directed by the provincial administration in the foundation of new fortified settlements.92 
This material transformation of the provincial landscape carried with it juridical, social 
and cultural consequences as frontier populations were forced into Byzantine molds.93 
The first wave of settlements occurred in the late ninth and early tenth centuries around 
Bari in Apulia and La Sila in Calabria and served to consolidate recent Byzantine gains. 
The second wave unfolded in the early tenth century and reinforced the thematic 
divisions on the Italian landscape; for instance, the thematic capital of Reggio was re-
established by the katepano Basil Boioannes during this period.94 The last wave, during 
the early eleventh century, saw the multiplication of cities in frontier zones as a 
defensive measure against increasing Norman encroachment: this was when the double 
line of fortified towns in the Capitanata was founded, of which Troia was but one.95  
Turning to social structures, there may have been a tendency to larger land 
holdings in Calabria, especially among ecclesiastical institutions while in Apulia, small 
landholders formed the norm.96 The social relations and the attendant balance of power 
thus may have tilted towards the large landholder in Calabria, while in Apulia the social 
landscape was much flatter; indeed, the ninth century episode of the emirate of Bari 
seems to have largely erased the local Lombard aristocracy.97 Thus, whatever notables 
did exist in the early eleventh century were either newly minted locals, often in a 
relationship of direct dependence to the Byzantine fisc, or eastern imports. The notables 
of the region can be classified into three basic classes: members of the princely families 
of the adjacent Lombard principalities; the local leading citizens; and the high-ranking 
Byzantine officials that made up the top tier of the local administration, such as the 
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strategoi or katepanoi.98 By the beginning of the eleventh century, Calabria, Lucania and 
Longobardia, had only recently left the jurisdiction of the Lombard principalities and as a 
consequence, many local power structures remained in place during the first few years 
of Byzantine dominion. They were treated as local clients by the imperial centre and 
either liquidated when the chance arose, or absorbed into the Byzantine taxis, where 
they gained titles, dignities and often a gilded exile at the Constantinopolitan court, 
although, they did not all go peaceably.99 Similarly, other members of the Lombard 
upper classes secured positions for themselves within the provincial administration. In 
practice, all but the highest imperial officials were drawn from the local population, as 
attested by the cartulary evidence. For instance, tourmarchs, who by the early eleventh 
century, had supplanted the judicial role of the gastaldus, were routinely drawn from the 
pool of local notables: names such as Lupo and Romoaldus are indicative of the 
practice.100 Similarly, the ek prosopou, seemingly a subordinate of the tourmarch, was 
occupied by the likes of Alfaranus and Mel.101 The trend continues among the lower 
ranked spatharioi.102  
Strategoi, katepanoi, and doukes were sent directly from Constantinople and 
acted as provincial governors, holding both military and administrative functions as the 
highest powers of the land. During their assignments they were expected to maintain a 
professional detachment, in order to prevent the creation of personal powerbases 
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throughout the empire.103 To that effect the most senior postings typically lasted for only 
a few years and officials were forbidden from owning property within their jurisdiction.104 
Furthermore, many of the occupants of these positions came from some of the most 
prestigious families of the empire: there were, for example, three Argyroi and two 
Dokeianoi, as well as a number from some lesser families such as a Delphinas and 
Tornikios.105 The prestige of these positions can be further seen in their placement in the 
courtly lists of precedence; the late tenth-century Taktikon Escorial has the katepanoi 
and strategoi in the second highest class of officials, with the katepano just above the 
doux of Thessaloniki, the empire’s second largest city.106 
Imperial power on the western periphery was exercised primarily through the 
office of the katepano. The office itself was created as part of administrative reforms 
begun under the emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (r.963-969) and completed under 
Ioannes Tzimiskes (r.969-976). Katepanoi, also termed doukes in places, were senior 
military commanders with broad gubernatorial powers over their commands. By the rise 
of Basileios II (r.976-1025), there were three in the east based on Antioch, Mesopotamia 
and Chaldia. Another two were later added in Iberia, modern day Georgia and the 
Armenian kingdom of Vaspurakan. In the west, doukes are attested for Thessaloniki and 
Adrianople, while we also find a katepano for Bulgaria.107 The katepano of Italy is first 
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attested between 971 and 975 in the Taktikon Escorial as part of the orders of 
precedence.108 However, the earliest attested presence of a senior commander 
performing the functions of the katepano, that is having broad gubernatorial powers over 
all Byzantine possessions in southern Italy, can be found in 965 with the appointment of 
the magistros Nikephoros Hexakionites.109 It is difficult to chart the exact relationship 
between the katepano and the strategoi listed as heads of each of the south Italian 
themes. The Taktikon Escorial lists the katepano well above the Italian strategoi, 
however, it is not clear what firm conclusions one can reasonably draw from what is in 
essence a tenth-century seating chart about the actual provincial administration.110 Both 
the katepano and the strategos of Calabria – the strategos of Lucania is very poorly 
attested – had sizeable bureaucracies at their disposal which suggests comparable 
administrative roles.111 It is clear however, that the katepano had military and civic pre-
eminence in the theme of Longobardia, where he was headquartered. However, given 
the katepano’s control of central imperial tagmatic troops, that pre-eminence may have 
extended over the strategoi of the themes of Calabria and Lucania, but there is, 
however, no hard evidence for this.112 
In practice, rather than acting as the long hand of Constantinople, it seems that in 
Italy at least, the katepanoi were granted considerable freedom of action. Taking the 
case of Eustathios Palatinos, a protospatharios and katepano for the years 1045 to 
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1046, we see a governor operating with a clear sense of his independence.113 In 
December, 1045, Palatinos issued a sigillion rewarding a Lombard judge (krites), named 
Byzantios for his recent service against the Normans, the rebellion of Georgios 
Maniakes, and the escort of the newly arrived katapano from the main Adriatic port of 
Otranto, north to his headquarters in Bari.114 For his service Byzantios is awarded two 
villages and all the future taxes and corvée due to the imperial fisc are transferred to 
him.115 Additionally, he is given the right of judgment, according to Lombard law, except 
in the case of murder, which is retained by the imperial authorities.116 In all, a rich prize 
indeed. We know precious little about this Byzantios, beyond what is contained in this 
sigillion.117 That he was already a man of some means is evidenced by his ability to 
place significant, presumably military aid, in the service of the empire. The imperial 
authorities, during this period were in need of friends like Byzantios. In September of 
1042, the katepano Georgios Maniakes rebelled in response to intrigues made against 
him at Constantinople.118 He caused significant disruption to the Byzantine position in 
southern Italy before crossing to Dyrrachion/Durazzo to march on the imperial capital; 
indeed, the office of the katepano remained vacant for two years until the arrival of 
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Palatinos.119 Moreover, while Normans were as yet unable to successfully besiege major 
towns, they controlled many of the smaller ones and judging by the aforementioned 
need of an escort, constituted a significant threat in Longobardia.120 While the granting of 
rewards for service by the Italian katepano is not unique – a Christophoros Bocomakè 
was similarly awarded the Tarantine monastery of St. Peter in 999 for his earlier service 
against Arab raids – what is unique is that Byzantios was granted his judicial privileges 
without reference to the imperial centre.121 In other words, it was unheard of for the 
Byzantine state to so completely relegate its jurisdiction to a private individual. This 
sigillion demonstrates, not only the precarious position that the imperial authorities found 
themselves in Italy during the eleventh century, but more importantly, that the katepanoi 
were given wide latitude to maintain the Byzantine presence in the Mezzogiorno. 
However, this is not to say that they had complete carte blanche; provincial 
governors could be, and often were, recalled. Eustathios Palatinos, the katepano from 
1045-1046, was relieved by his successor Ioannes Raphael, who arrived in Bari with a 
contingent of Varangian reinforcements following his predecessor’s defeat by the 
Normans at the southern Apulian city of Taranto.122 The emperor Michael IV the 
Paphlagonian (r.1010-1041) recalled Michael Dokeianos following his defeat at the 
hands of the Normans, first in March 1041 near the river Olivento, between Melfi and 
Lavello, and then seven weeks later in May near Cannae.123 Military success seems to 
have been a condition of employment. In what may be an apocryphal story, a century 
and a half earlier, during the reign of the empress Irene (r.797-803), the patrician Narses 
failed to send the then standard tax returns to Constantinople, having instead spent it on 
defence. In response, the empress sent him a spindle and distaff and told him to: “take 
                                                     
119 Maniakes killed his replacement Pardos in 1042 [Ann. Lupi 145; Skylitzes XXI.3, pp.400-403; 
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these, your proper instruments; for we have judged it fit that you should spin, rather than 
that as a man of arms you should defend and guide and do battle for the Romans.”124 
Efficient administration was obviously also expected. The only other recall on record is 
that of Basil Boioannes, who after a decade in office (the longest on record) received an 
imperial mandaton conferring the office of katepano on his replacement Christophoros 
Burgaris. There is no question surrounding his record; the local annals refer to him as 
‘Vulcanus’ while Skylitzes notes that he “brought all of Italy as far as Rome under the 
subjection to the emperor.”125 It’s quite possible that Boioannes was a victim of his own 
success and was recalled in order to prevent him from becoming too entrenched. 
Imperial authority was exercised through a variety of different means and 
demonstrated not only the latitude discussed above, but also a great deal of adaptability. 
When faced with challenges to imperial authority, mercy could form the rule. When the 
people of Rossano rose up against the local authorities who had perhaps demanded too 
much in terms of material tribute, the Calabrian governor pardoned them, asking only for 
financial compensation for the damage done.126 In other situations, however, violence 
would be employed. The Annals record numerous examples of executions: the patrician 
Ioannes Ammiropoulos killed Leo of Cannae and Nicholas the krites, for a murder 
committed two years prior in 987;127 Dattus, the rebel Melos’ brother-in-law, was 
paraded on an ass into Bari in 1021, a Byzantine custom, and later executed;128 four 
men were hanged on the walls of Bitonto by the katepano Michael Dokeianos in 1041.129 
In contrast, the katepano could issue rewards for loyal service, as seen in the cases of 
the judge Byzantios and Christophoros Bocomakè discussed above. Imperial authorities 
could even purchase their enemies when the situation arose, as they did when they 
purchased the loyalty of Argyros, the son of Melos, who had been acclaimed prince and 
duke of Italy by the Normans and the militia of Bari; for the price of the titles of vestes 
                                                     
124 DAI, 27. 
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126 See above, nt.63, for bibliography. 
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patrikios, and antipathos,130 he returned to the imperial fold.131 A similar attempt failed 
with Georgios Maniakes in 1043 who instead killed the imperial envoy sent to negotiate 
with him, while an effort vis-à-vis the Norman Duke, Robert Guiscard, only bought the 
Empire a decade before he invaded Byzantine possessions in the Balkans.132 What all 
the above examples demonstrate, is that imperial rule in the Mezzogiorno was based on 
pragmatism; when faced with serious threats to its authority, as in the case of the revolt 
in Rossano, Georgios Maniakes’ rebellion, Argyros, son of Melos’ insubordination and 
Robert Guiscard’s outright hostility, the tendency was to negotiate, while in minor cases 
of normal justice, the response could be a brutal performance of imperial wrath. 
Such pragmatism should not be taken, however, as unique to the imperial 
periphery. It was also on display within the core provinces of the empire. The city of 
Raidestos was located three days east from Constantinople along the Via Egnatia, the 
main military highway that cut through the Balkans and ran from Dyrrachion/Durazzo on 
the Adriatic coast, all the way east to the Byzantine capital. In 1077, at the urging of the 
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wife of the local dynast Ioannes Batazes, the city elected to join the rebellion of 
Nikephoros Bryennios, a relative of her husband.133 The inhabitants tore down the 
phoundax, the silo for the imperial grain monopoly, attacked the nearby fortress of 
Panion which had remained loyal to the emperor, and fortified the city’s harbor in 
anticipation of an attack by imperial forces. The historian and judge, Michael Attaleiates, 
who is our source for this uprising, describes the events succinctly: “simply put, 
everything was in great turmoil and confusion.”134 Attaleiates was present in the city 
before the inhabitants moved to open revolt and was tipped off to the conspiracy by one 
of his clients. After some tense moments at the city’s gates, he managed to negotiate his 
free passage out of rebel territory and made his way to the capital. Upon his arrival he 
went straight to the palace and spoke with the logothetes Nikephoros who was entrusted 
with the public administration, and urged him to immediately dispatch chrysoboulla to 
Raidestos and the surrounding cities “and secure its loyalty with displays of compassion 
and understanding” while at the same time calling up the army; done swiftly, according 
to Attaleiates, these actions could stem the flow of cities to the rebel’s side.135 The 
logothetes failed to act quickly and the rebellion took root, however, Attaleiates’ 
suggestion speaks to recognition by those in the imperial administration of the value of 
pragmatism. Denying the rebel allies so near the capital through the dispatch of a simple 
communiqué offering concessions and, one must assume, bribes was vastly preferred 
over the material and social disruption caused by imperial troops. 
Imperial government not only left its mark on the people over whom it governed 
but also on the physical landscape. In an effort to cement Byzantine claims to the newly 
reconquered territory of the Mezzogiorno, and provide a useful outlet for a growing 
population, recall that the provincial government undertook several waves of city 
building. Additionally, the katepano and the imperial authority that he represented was a 
prominent feature on the urban landscape of Bari. In 1011, the katepano Basil 
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Mesardonites completed construction on the city’s praetorion, the fortified compound 
that housed the province’s administrative apparatus and was a normal feature of 
Byzantine cities in the east.136 The surviving dedicatory inscription notes the construction 
of a fortified arch, a vestibule, a garrison and a church dedicated to the Byzantine warrior 
saint, St Demetrios, all constructed of stone.137 Three more churches would appear over 
the years, St. Sofia, St. Basil and St. Eustratios.138 The compound would also have 
contained a prison, the courts, the tax-registrar, the bureaucracy and offices, and served 
as the residence of the katepano.139 Located near one of the city’s two ports, on the site 
of the present day cathedral of St. Nicholas, the praetorion would have been a physical 
reminder of Byzantine dominion in Apulia. Indeed the presence of churches dedicated to 
the most important Byzantine military saint (St. Demetrios), and to the most holy church 
in Byzantium (Hagia Sofia) could only serve to symbolically evoke Byzantine military and 
cultural hegemony over the mainly Lombard population of Longobardia.140 However, this 
hegemony was not without its cracks; indeed, the praetorion was constructed as a 
response to a recent rebellion by the Baresi.141 Moreover, it would serve as a locus of 
resistance: it is certainly no accident that the cathedral, consecrated in 1089 to house 
the relics of St. Nicholas of Myra should be built on its ruins.142 Once rid of this symbol 
the Baresi did not want it to return, and a century later reacted violently against the 
Saracen workers sent to build a citadel near their city by the Norman King Roger II of 
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Sicily.143 This jealously guarded independence, and the collective autonomy that it 
suggests, becomes even clearer during the Norman Conquest. 
This chapter has charted the resurgence of Byzantine rule in the Mezzogiorno, 
following the setbacks to imperial fortunes caused by the sixth-century invasion of the 
Lombards, as well as the Muslim raids that reached their height in the ninth and tenth 
centuries. Around the turn of the millennium, imperial rule extended over all of southern 
Italy, with the exception of Sicily which was never to return to Byzantine control. The 
failure to recapture Sicily, despite repeated attempts, meant that Muslim raiders had a 
nearby base with which to threaten Byzantine inhabitants of the mainland that the 
provincial administration was powerless to combat. Taxes were increased, but this only 
caused more discontent as the raids continued to threaten the region’s newfound 
prosperity. Imperial authority, and the expansive state apparatus that served it, was 
ubiquitous in the region. Imperial officials, drawn from the local population were in every 
city, registering land transfers, maintaining tax registers, and settling disputes while the 
katepanoi operated on a regional level, founding cities and defending Byzantine interests 
in the region. On a social level, this may have had a profound effect on indigenous 
modes of thought as locals navigated a discursive culture of petition and response. 
Imperial authority operated pragmatically – “dealing ‘before all’ with each person as they 
deserve” as William of Apulia noted at the outset of this Chapter – and this created the 
space for dissent.144 Ultimately, this ‘space’ was also where political agency and urban 
autonomy found its expression, the examination of which forms the subject of what 
follows. 
                                                     
143 Telese II.34, p.16. The Baresi were initially able to fend off efforts to build a citadel, by 
negotiating with King Roger II while he was in a position of weakness during a rebellion. Roger II 
later returned once the rebellion was put down and pushed through the construction. Telese II.49, 
p.19. 
144 Will. Apulia Book I, p.5 
 36 
Chapter 2.  
 
The Mezzogiorno in Change: The Norman 
Conquest and Urban Autonomy 
Tuesday, February 12, 6553 (= 1045), Indiction 13, the inhabitants of the cities of 
Brindisi, Lecce, Otranto, Oria, and their rural communes (οἰ χωριᾶται) came to 
Nardò; there they took a large quantity of cloths, cattle, and other goods, and 
also books; in short, they devastated the whole town of Nardò and killed many of 
its inhabitants; they remained there two days. After the two days, the people from 
the city of Gallipoli and its rural communes arrived and took all that was left. 
Nardò, which was the source of supplies of all the cities and their rural 
communes, has remained, thanks to divine Providence, the most wealthy in 
wheat, wine, meat, fish, vegetables, and all other produce.145 
The above annalistic entry is preserved as a palimpsest and was published by 
the French byzantinist André Guillou as an appendix entitled “Brigandage among the 
cities in the Theme of Longobardia.” Guillou treats this as evidence of “the coherence of 
the urban center” but leaves unexamined the implications of such coherence.146 What 
these acts of ‘brigandage’ represent is not just the cities’ ‘coherence’ but also their 
political agency. While there is no evidence for the reasons that led a collection of some 
of the major cities of southern Apulia to turn against one of their neighbours, this was a 
time of disturbances caused by the arrival of the Normans. Indeed, recall that also in 
1045, the newly arrived katepano, Eusthatios Palatinos needed a military escort in order 
to reach his new posting in Bari.147 Nardò was rich in supplies and the so-called 
‘brigands’ made sure to secure “large quantities of cloths, cattle, and other goods, and 
also books,” which could only have helped them survive these uncertain times. The rapid 
eclipse of imperial authority that followed the first Norman successes in the fourth 
decade of the first millennium opened the way for urban polities to exercise their political 
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agency as they sought to defend their autonomy. Cities and towns across the 
Mezzogiorno alternatively resisted, surrendered, negotiated and rose up again as each 
urban polity charted their own way forward in shifting circumstances. What follows is an 
exposition of these uncertain times and an analysis of the reaction of urban polities to 
the disturbances caused by the Norman invasions. Ultimately, as imperial authority 
melted away in the face of the Norman advance, the cities of Byzantine Italy behaved as 
autonomous collectives that acted to defend their own local interests. 
The origins of the Normans were a subject of myth-making by their chroniclers. 
Amatus of Montecassino, wrote after 1080 that they originally hailed from an island 
called ‘Nora’, from which they took their name. This “very robust and strong people” had 
outgrown their homeland, and taking up arms, had “scattered throughout the world and 
made their own way.”148 William of Apulia has them descending upon the frontiers of 
Italy from the “boreal forests” and notes that their name means “men of the north 
wind.”149 Gaufredo Malaterra, on the other hand, claims that the Normans originally 
emigrated from Norway, before settling in Gaul; King Louis II of Francia feared the 
bloodshed that would result in any effort to expel them.150 They were alternatively 
celebrated and feared as great warriors and could be found scattered throughout the 
Mediterranean world.151 While there are competing stories of the arrival of the Normans 
in southern Italy, we know that when the Normans eventually made their way to Italy 
they were to leave an indelible mark on the region.152 
While the presence of the Normans in the Mezzogiorno is attested as early as 
the year c.1000, they did not begin to make serious problems for the Byzantines until 
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several decades into the second millennium.153 When they first arrived in the south of 
Italy they worked as mercenaries for various local lords, who quickly grasped their 
military value. The rebel Melos employed them during his second revolt against the 
Byzantines that ended in defeat in 1018.154 The Norman survivors found work with the 
Prince of Benevento, the Abbot of Montecassino, the Prince of Salerno, Guaimar III and 
by the newly restored Duke of Naples, Sergius IV who installed them at Aversa in 
1030.155 Despite their service against his rival, the Prince of Capua, the relationship 
between the Normans and Guaimar III appears to have deteriorated. So when the 
Byzantine emperor’s representative, Georgios Maniakes requested troops for an attack 
on Sicily, the Prince leapt at the opportunity to rid himself of his Norman problem; the 
two Hauteville brothers, William and Drogo were among the contingent.156 The 1038 
campaign against Sicily was initially successful; according to a number of the Greek 
sources, the Byzantines took thirteen cities and occupied the whole island.157 Maniakes 
was, however, recalled to Constantinople in 1040/1 due to political intrigues in the 
Byzantine capital, and the hard fought gains on the island were soon lost.158 
Before Georgios Maniakes was recalled, however, he managed to run afoul of 
the Normans in his army.159 A north Italian named Arduin was attached to the Norman 
contingent, either as a liaison – for he spoke Greek – or as one of their commanders.160 
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There arose a dispute over the division of the spoils and Arduin was sent to resolve the 
issue with the Byzantine commander, either Maniakes or one of his subordinates, the 
sources disagree on the point.161 The sources do agree however that having been 
flogged and humiliated he left the Sicilian expedition enraged and began plotting his 
revenge.162 Arduin proceeded to ingratiate himself with the new katepano, Michael 
Dokeianos, who had arrived to replace the disgraced Maniakes. He plied the Byzantine 
official with gold and according to Amatus, “he was well received, elevated to high 
honour, and made prefect of many cities.”163 In particular, he was made topoteretes of 
the northern Apulian city of Melfi, a recent foundation of Basil Boiannes in the 
Capitanata.164 Arduin used this opportunity to ingratiate himself with the inhabitants, 
throwing lavish banquets and empathizing with their troubles: “he uttered words of 
compassion, pretending that he was distraught at the grievances that they suffered from 
Greek lordship and the insults the Greeks gave their women;” consequently, “they all 
wanted Arduin, this saint-like person as their lord. They told him that they would obey 
him.”165  
Arduin was tapping into a deep vein of resentment against the imperial 
authorities that was felt throughout Byzantine Italy. This discontent was rooted in what 
were seen as burdensome demands for men and material for the planned invasion of 
Sicily and ultimately provoked autonomous action on the part of urban polities that 
sought to have their displeasure addressed. Indeed, the Prince of Salerno was not the 
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only one to supply troops for the assault on Sicily; according to Amatus: “the Apulians 
and Calabrians were obliged by the emperor’s money to take part in this arduous 
campaign, and this stirred up the people and the nobles.”166 And stirred up they were – 
in 1040, Bari itself was rocked by a revolt by the local militia, or konteratoi, led by an 
imperial krites; the inhabitants took advantage of the absence of the katepano to assert 
their autonomy and voice their displeasure at imperial impositions. Argyros, the son of 
the rebel Melos, used this opportunity to take control of the city.167 This discontent with 
Byzantine rule, taken together with the fact that southern Italy was largely denuded of 
troops for Maniakes’ 1038 invasion of Sicily, made Byzantine territories an easy and 
tempting target for the Normans.168  
Notwithstanding this discontent, inhabitants of Byzantine Italy were not ready to 
completely throw in their lot with the Normans and resisted making a final break with the 
imperial authorities. Arduin, using a fabricated trip to Rome as an excuse, instead 
travelled to the Norman base of operations at Aversa, and recruited them for the 
invasion of Apulia.169 Ardiun’s charge, Melfi, was the site of the first blow; he entered the 
city at night with the Normans whom he asked to “effect peaceful occupation.”170 In a 
display of collective action, the inhabitants armed themselves and prepared to defend 
their city but Arduin addressed them, building on the relationship that he had already 
established with them, and claimed that he was there to liberate them: “these men are 
not the enemy but great friends… [and] have come to loosen the yoke which bound 
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with more fully below, in Chapter 3. Bari was never completely at peace. For example, the 
annalistic sources attest to tit for tat violence from 982 to 989: Ann. Lupi. 82, 89, 91, 92; Cheynet, 
Pouvoir et contestations, 30. 
168 Malaterra I, p.8. Taken together with the other sources, Malaterra’s comment that all was 
peaceful should be taken with caution. See also discussion in: Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 
79-80. 
169 Amatus II.17, p.69-70. 
170 Amatus II.19, p.70. 
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you.”171 Recognizing that they perhaps had little choice given that their own commander 
had betrayed them and moreover that the enemy, perhaps numbering as many as 300 
Normans, was already in the city, the Melfitani yielded: “each side took an oath to 
preserve the peace faithfully.”172 The next morning found the Normans on a spree: 
“happy and joyous they went riding here and there on their horses.”173 They attacked 
and looted the nearby cities of Venosa, Ascoli, and Lavello, which prompted a response 
from the imperial authorities. A hastily dispatched army, under the personal command of 
the katepano Michael Dokeianos, was defeated on 17 March, 1041; a second, much 
larger army, was defeated several weeks later, on 4 May, while a third battle was fought 
on 3 September that resulted in yet another defeat for the Byzantines. The new 
katepano, sent to replace Dokeianos, was captured; ‘Exaugustus’ Boiaonnes was “led in 
chains…walking before the victor’s horse, since his enemy wanted to emphasize the 
scale of his triumph.”174 With imperial forces in disarray, the main fortified cities of Apulia 
came to terms with the Normans, Bari included, where Argyros, son of Melos, moved to 
secure his hold on the city.175 In 1042, with the support of the Normans, Argyros was 
elected princeps and dux of Italy, marking the beginning of the end for the Byzantines in 
the Mezzogiorno.176 
While Byzantine forces seemed to be unable to halt the Norman advance, it 
appears that their former subjects had resolved to mount their own defence, thereby 
                                                     
171 Ibid. 
172 Amatus II.18-19, p.70; William of Apulia has them capture the city, while Malaterra, incorrectly 
states that the Normans built the city: Will. Apulia Book I, p.8; Malaterra I.8, p.7. 
173 Amatus II.20, p.70. 
174 Ann. Lupi. 137-8; Ann. Bar. 21-24; Anon. Bar. 150-151; Amatus II.21-26, pp.71-75;Will. Apulia 
Book I, pp.8-12; Malaterra I.8-10; Skylitzes XXI.3, pp.400-403; Quote: Will. Apulia Book I, p.12. 
175 Will. Apulia Book I, p.12; Ann. Bar. 25. 
176 Falkenhausen, La dominazione bizantina, 97-98; “Princeps et dux Italiae; Loud and Norwich 
both emphasize, correctly, that the Normans success depended on the restiveness of population. 
Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 92-94; Norwich, The Normans in the South, 62-63. 
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asserting their autonomy.177 According to Malaterra, the ‘Lombards’ of Apulia had 
“conceived a secret plot to murder all the Normans throughout Apulia on the same 
day.”178 The uprising was planned for the feast day of St. Lawrence the Martyr, 10 
August.179 On the appointed day in 1051, Count Drogo entered a church in the city of 
Montillaro; Drogo Hauteville had been Count and overall leader of the Normans for five 
years following the death of his brother William Bras-de-fer.180 The sources disagree on 
whether he came at night, or at daybreak, but agree that he was cut down in an ambush 
as he entered the church; Amatus identifies the assassin as Riso, an intimate to the 
Count.181 According to Malaterra, “many others in Apulia met their end in this 
conspiracy.”182 Drogo’s brother Humphrey succeeded him as Count and set to work 
punishing his brother’s assassins: “he inflicted all sorts of tortures… and after a while the 
anger and grief he felt in his heart were quenched by their blood.”183 The significance of 
this uprising rests in its scale; according to Malaterra the plan encompassed all the 
Normans of Apulia. Given that the Normans were only in effective of control of northern 
Apulia at this time, the area of effect can be reduced, a fact supported by the location of 
Drogo’s assassination, Montillaro, located on the northern border of Apulia with 
Benevento. Nonetheless, this is a large area for such a conspiracy. The episode at 
Montillaro involved the collusion of at least a portion of the residents, indeed, Malaterra 
mentions explicitly the presence of accomplices and that only a few members of Drogo’s 
                                                     
177 Primary accounts of the conspiracy: Amatus III.19,22, pp.92-94; Malaterra I.13, p.9; Will. 
Apulia Book II, p.18; Ann. Lupi. 154; Anon. Bar. 151. The ‘Lombards’ may have been inspired by 
the actions of Abbot Richer, of the Abbey of Montecassino, who had managed to expel the 
Normans from the Terri Sancti Benedicti in 1045. The expulsion was precipitated by the 
massacre of a party of Normans that had come to pray at a church in the city of S. Germano; a 
battle followed, where God himself appeared, with St. Benedict acting as a standard bearer, and 
the Normans were routed. The Abbott subsequently fortified his lands against any further 
encroachments. Primary accounts: Amatus II.42-43, p.83; Chron. Cas. II.71, pp.309-312; see 
also: Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 102; Idem., “Continuity and Change in Norman Italy,” in 
Conquerors and Churchmen in Norman Italy. Variorum Collected Studies Series CS658 
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999), V:333-343; H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Age of 
Abbot Desiderius: Montecassinno, the Papacy, and the Normans in the Eleventh and Early 
Twelfth Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 113-114. 
178 Malaterra I.13, p.9. 
179 Amatus III.22, p.94. 
180 Ann. Lupi. 149. 
181 Amatus III.22, p.94. 
182 Malaterra I.13, p.9. 
183 Ibid. 
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entourage managed to escape.184 It is safe to assume that a comital escort would have 
been sizeable, so there must have been a great deal of accomplices; the subsequent 
siege by Drogo’s vengeful brother Humphrey would surely have made converts out of 
the remainder. While the sources are short on specifics of this conspiracy outside of 
Montillaro, if this kind of urban collective action was replicated across the region, then it 
would represent a significant moment of resistance to Norman efforts to curtail political 
autonomy on both a civic and regional level.185 
The following year, in 1052, the city (kastron) of Bisignano, located in northern 
Calabria, was the site of an interesting encounter between the inhabitants and Robert 
Guiscard.186 Bisignano, located within twenty kilometres of Guiscard’s first base in the 
region, was “rich in gold, animals, and precious cloth,” and therefore made a tempting 
target for the newly arrived Norman.187 Guiscard was in no position to capture the city by 
force; Bisignano was a major town and probably walled, while the Norman could better 
be described as a brigand during these early years, rather than the feared warlord that 
he would become.188 The most prominent citizen of the city, Peter de Tira, is described 
as the wealthiest inhabitant; Malaterra uses the rather picturesque phrase “rolling in 
money.”189  He is also described as the leading citizen of the city, while one chronicler 
                                                     
184 Ibid. 
185 The people of Apulia would soon after appeal for help from the pope: Will. Apulia Book I, p.17; 
Malaterra I.14, p.9. William of Apulia records that the “rebel kastra everywhere helped the 
Germans and gave them [the Normans] no provisions or material help.” Will. Apulia Book I, p.19. 
186 Primary sources for this episode are: Malaterra I.17-18, pp.11-12; Amatus III.10, p.89; 
Kekaumenos II.85, pp.126-128; Leo of Ostia also records the incident, but is omitted here due to 
its similarity to Amatus’ account. The Alexiad also contains a similar story, but instead of Peter de 
Tira, the Guiscard’s victim is changed to William Mascabeles: Alexiad I.11, pp.38-42.  For a 
discussion see: G.A. Loud, “Anna Komnena and her Sources for the Normans of Southern Italy,” 
in Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages: Essays presented to John Taylor, eds. Ian Wood 
and G.A. Loud (London: The Hambleton Press, 1991), 54-57. 
187 Quote: Amatus III.10, p.89; According to Malaterra, when Guiscard first arrived in Calabria, 
probably in 1048, he was first installed in the Crati valley, but that location proved to be unhealthy 
and malarial. He soon moved with his men to a hilltop site at San Marco, some 20km southwest. 
Malaterra I.12, 16, pp. 9, 10. 
188 Kekaumenos also notes the presence of a moat: Kekaumenos II.85, pp.126-128. Amatus 
states that Guiscard “was poor so he became a brigand because his knights were few and there 
was little money in his purse.” Amatus III.8, p.88.  
189 Quote: Malaterra I.17 p. 11; Peter de Tira is also called Peter, son of Tyre, and Teras the 
Calabrian, depending on the source. 
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refers to him as the city’s guardian (phylax).190 Indeed, according to Malaterra, “he and 
Guiscard were in the habit of having frequent meetings, as though at court, to discuss 
the various disputes which occurred between their men.”191 Peter is clearly a 
representative, if not the outright leader of the city and while he is not attested as having 
a Byzantine title, it would be odd that someone of his stature (i.e. wealth and power) 
should remain outside the imperial taxis, especially given that he makes it into the 
personal memoires and accounts of a Byzantine author and former general from across 
the Adriatic.  
The episode in question occurred during one of these ‘meetings.’ Guiscard laid a 
trap for Peter de Tira in an effort to extract not only a significant amount of money from 
the city’s guardian, but also to conquer the city. The two men arranged to meet in a 
neutral location; Malaterra and Kekaumenos both agree that it was directly outside the 
city, while Amatus merely states that it was a secure location.192 By all accounts, the two 
men met and parleyed away from their entourages at Guiscard’s request, reportedly out 
of fear for his own safety. Once alone, Guiscard overpowered Peter and took him 
prisoner; Malaterra has the Norman throw de Tira dramatically over his shoulders and 
run towards his men who, at a prearranged signal, rushed to his defence. The Norman 
then took Peter to his base at San Marco, where he proceeded to extort a sizeable 
ransom from him; however, despite Guiscard’s efforts, he was not able to gain 
possession of Bisignano because the citizens “would not agree to this.”193 However, 
Guiscard was able to apply some pressure on the city, by subjecting them, and the 
surrounding cities, to daily raids. Ultimately, they capitulated and the citizens of 
Bisignano and the nearby cities of Cosenza and Martirano made a treaty with Guiscard 
                                                     
190 Guardianship: Kekaumenos II.85, pp.126-128. 
191 Malaterra I.17, p.11. 
192 Kekaumenos states that they met near the city’s moat, while Malaterra says that the exchange 
occurred in the plain outside the city. Malaterra I.17, p.11; Amatus III.10, p.89; Kekaumenos II.85, 
pp.126-128. The Alexiad records that they met in the marshy valley between two hills: Alexiad 
I.11.5, p.40. 
193 Malaterra I.17, pp.11-12. The eastern sources mention that he was tortured; Kekaumenos 
obliquely states the he was subjected to ‘torments,’ while the Alexiad has Guiscard exchange 
each of de Tira’s teeth for gold and once he had run out of teeth (and gold), he blinded him. 
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one: Kekaumenos II.85, pp.126-128; Alexiad I.11.8, p.42. Loud, “Anna Komnena and her 
Sources,” 56. 
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whereby they retained possession of their kastron, while owing the Norman tribute and 
service.194  
The events at Bisignano are significant, not only because they represented an 
early success for Guiscard in Calabria and boosted his reputation, but also because they 
featured an urban polity acting collectively to defend its interests. Once Peter de Tira 
was removed by Guiscard, we see the citizens of Bisignano taking their affairs in hand; 
Malaterra states that while in captivity Peter “was unable to hand over the kastron, for 
the citizens would not agree to this.”195 De Tira was not on hand to direct the actions of 
the city and as such was not able to apply whatever pressure his position would normally 
allow. Without him, the citizens looked to their own interests, which were in this case, not 
to surrender their city to Guiscard. While the inhabitants were ultimately pressured by 
Guiscard through his raids to change their minds, they were nonetheless able to 
negotiate their capitulation. This was not the wholesale surrender that Guiscard had 
envisioned, but a negotiated settlement. The people acted in cooperation with the 
neighbouring cities, perhaps reflecting their common bonds with them, forged under 
years of Byzantine rule. Together they were able to present a stronger front to the 
Normans, thereby softening the terms of their surrender. 196 Ultimately, without Peter de 
Tira, the citizens of Bisignano and surrounding cities were able to act collectively in order 
to defend their interests, even when presented with a losing battle.  
Even once conquered, cities could still offer resistance to their Norman overlords. 
The city of Neocastrum, literally ‘new castle’ so possibly a new foundation, located on 
the Gulf of Lamezia in southern Calabria, was subjugated by Robert Guiscard during his 
first foray into Calabria in 1057. The city surrendered to him, along with the cities of 
Maida and Canalea on Guiscard’s return journey from Reggio, which he had 
reconnoitred but failed to besiege.197 A year later, when Guiscard and his brother the 
                                                     
194 Malaterra I.17, p.12. The capitulation of Bisignano and the surrounding cities appears only in 
Malaterra. 
195 Malaterra I.17, p.12. 
196 The people of Bisignano, Cosenza and Martirano were able to retain control of their cities, 
while they swore oaths and provided hostages, promising to provide tribute and service. All else 
being equal, these were fairly generous terms. Malaterra I.17, p.12. In any event, the Normans 
lacked the manpower to leave a proper garrison. 
197 Malaterra I.18, p.12. 
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Count, Roger were “at loggerheads with each other” over the division of spoils, the 
people of Calabria began to “throw off the Norman yoke, and refused to pay the tribute 
and service which they had sworn to give.”198 The inhabitants of Neocastrum made an 
agreement with the Normans to surrender their fortifications, but instead laid a trap and 
“simulating good faith… that same day they slew the sixty Normans who had been left 
as its garrison.”199 The inhabitants of Neocastrum, thus took advantage of the chaos 
caused by the dispute between the two Hauteville brothers to remove their oppressors 
and regain their autonomy. While the ultimate fate of Neocastrum is obscure, the 
collective action involved in conceiving of and executing their deception and subsequent 
revolt is indicative of a political agency, based on the city. 
The city of Gerace, located in southern Calabria, was the site a number of 
moments of resistance to the Normans.200 In 1059, the ek prosopou of the city and the 
Bishop of Cassano raised a very large army and marched against the Norman kastron of 
San Martino in the Saline Valley; their forces were surrounded and destroyed by 
Guiscard’s brother and future Count of Sicily, Roger.201 Three years later, in 1062, the 
city became embroiled in a dispute between the two Hauteville brothers, as the Count 
Roger rose in rebellion against Guiscard in an effort to force the Duke to honour his 
earlier commitments; Malaterra states that “the duke, while generous with money, was 
stingy in giving over the smallest portion of land.”202 Roger had travelled to Gerace with 
                                                     
198 Malaterra I.28, p.15. 
199 Malaterra I.28, p.15. 
200 According to legend, the city was founded in the tenth century by the inhabitants who were 
fleeing a 915 Saracen attack of the coast. They were reportedly led to the site by a hawk, and 
hence its name: Ιέραξ, which means ‘hawk’. In fact, archaeological evidence points to a Neolithic 
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one hundred knights, fleeing his brother’s siege of Miletto.203 Guiscard followed angrily 
with his entire army and laid siege to the city. Despite having surrendered to Roger, the 
Geraci appear to have had divided loyalties: Malaterra states that “some of the 
inhabitants of Gerace had sworn fealty” to the Duke; given that Guiscard was “suffused 
with rage” when he heard the news, it is likely that the city had previously been in his 
possession. At issue appears to be the fear that Guiscard would construct a citadel in or 
near their city “which would make them all henceforth entirely subject to his wishes,” 
something that the inhabitants could not abide and as such they refused his demands for 
surrender.204 Notwithstanding this opposition, or perhaps because of it, Guiscard entered 
the city in disguise in order to meet with one of the leading men of the city, Basil, who 
had invited him to dinner. Basil, judging by his name was a member of the Greek 
community and most likely part of the former Byzantine administration in the city; his 
wealth would indicate that he had at the very least done well under the empire.205  
Unfortunately, Malaterra doesn’t indicate what the subject of the dinner 
conversation was to be – they never got to dinner – but the Geraci certainly had their 
own opinions on the matter at hand. One of Basil’s servants tipped off the Geraci to the 
presence of the Duke in the city and “suspecting treason, were very much disturbed.” 
This was an understatement; the town was in an “uproar” and rushed, fully armed, to 
Basil’s house. The Duke was oblivious to the danger and was chatting amicably with his 
host’s wife, Melita as the meal was being prepared. The “ignorant mob” struck Basil 
down with a sword as he attempted to flee to the sanctuary of a church, while his wife 
was impaled on a stake. There ensued a fearful scene of friends killing friends, and the 
lower classes killing the upper, while Guiscard is described as despairing of his life. 
                                                     
203 This episode is record solely by Malaterra: Malaterra II.24-27, p.25-27. 
204 Urban polities objected quite strongly to the construction of citadels and giving up control of 
their defences. Bari would kill the Saracen builders sent by King Roger II to build a citadel during 
the twelfth century, a battle that they would ultimately lose: A citadel would be constructed by 
King Roger II, but not without meeting significant resistance from the locals: Telese II.34, 49, pp. 
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p.70. 
205 Malaterra says that they ate dinner at his ‘palatium’ or palace [Malaterra II.24, p.25]. The lack 
of a Byzantine title in the account is not evidence that he was not part of the Byzantine taxis, 
given Malaterra’s evident unfamiliarity with them; for example, he garbles ek prosopou into 
praesopus [Malaterra I.32, p.15]. See nt.201 above. 
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Malaterra’s description of Guiscard during these tense moments is worth quoting at 
length:  
He who had once been the destroyer of many thousands stood like a soldier who 
was unprotected and without his weapons amid the threats of his furious 
enemies, and the leonine ferocity which had been to some extent part of his 
nature was transformed into a lamb-like gentleness.206 
The great Norman Duke, who was said to have caused both the Franks and Greeks to 
quake in their boots, was brought low by a mob.207 
 While there is a certain amount of Schadenfreude to be felt for the situation that 
Robert Guiscard found himself in, there is nonetheless a great deal to be learned from 
the mêlée. Malaterra refers to the fighters as an “ignorant mob,” with citizens attacking 
their fellow citizens, friend against friend, and so on. In contrast to the tumult, Malaterra 
observes that “the more sensible people… were doing their best to restrain the 
extraordinary fury of the ignorant mob;” he writes later of “the wiser men of the town.”208 
Our source posits a division in the city, with one faction wanting the death of Guiscard, in 
order to prevent the construction of a citadel, and another seeking to respect their sworn 
fealty to the Duke. However, Malaterra’s hostility towards the “ignorant mob” and its 
juxtaposition against the “wiser men of the town” is based more on his own distaste for 
the Calabrians, whom he calls elsewhere “a most untrustworthy people,” than on the 
composition of the fracas.209 Cooler heads would prevail – those “wiser men of the town” 
– and Guiscard was taken into custody, however, not before he delivered a speech to 
the “more sensible people.” The Norman Duke took a rather stiff tone with them, telling 
not to be “falsely overjoyed, lest the wheel of fortune, which at the moment favours you 
and is against me, turns in future so that it shows its adverse face to you, since nobody 
enjoys any advantage without divine favour.” He proceeds to tell them that he had not 
come to plot against them, and highlights the oath of fealty that many of them had taken 
to him. Not having anything to lose must have freed his tongue for Guiscard points to the 
                                                     
206 Malaterra II.24, p.25. 
207 Gesta Tancredi I, p.21. 
208 Malaterra II.24, p.25-6. 
209 Malaterra I.28, p.15; he has the same words for the Greeks, whom he calls the “most 
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vengeance that his people would extract from the Geraci, and ends with a threat: “should 
you perjure yourselves and pollute your hand with my blood… not just you but all your 
descendants will incur eternal shame for your perjury.”210 
 The Duke’s men, by this time, had heard the news that Guiscard had been taken 
prisoner by the city’s inhabitants. Not wishing to risk a rescue they appealed to the 
Duke’s brother Roger who, at least nominally, had dominion over the Geraci.211 Upon 
hearing the news, the Count took up his arms and hurried to the city; the sources are not 
clear on where he had been during these events. Roger arrived and asked to speak with 
the inhabitants, giving them safe passage to travel outside the walls of their city. The 
Norman Count greeted them as “friends and fideles” and thanked them for their loyalty in 
recognizing and capturing his enemy for him, but forbade them from harming his brother, 
claiming that Guiscard “had so roused my anger that I shall not be satisfied if he meets 
death from any other arms than my own.” And in what was becoming an Hauteville 
family tradition, he threatened the Geraci: “if you try to put things off any longer your 
vineyards and olive groves will be destroyed. We shall besiege your city, and when our 
siege engines appear no defence will avail you and it will fall… you will be treated as 
enemies, and will be tortured.”212 The terrified embassy returned to their city and 
informed their fellow citizens of the Count’s demands. Ultimately, they decided to release 
Guiscard, but not before they extracted an oath from the Duke that should he survive his 
brother’s wrath, that he would never construct a citadel in their city.213 The Hauteville 
brothers reconciled soon after with Guiscard agreeing to share Calabria with Roger. 
Perhaps reflecting the realties on the ground, they also chose to divide the city of 
Gerace between themselves. Count Roger would return soon after, and begin 
construction on a castle (castellum) outside the city walls in an effort to “extort” a greater 
tribute from them. Realizing that the oath that they had extracted from Guiscard was 
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worthless, they acquiesced and agreed to the tribute, thereby halting the construction of 
the castle.214 
 The significance of the events at Gerace rests in the actions of the city’s 
inhabitants in the absence of imperial leadership and the discursive strategies that the 
Hauteville brothers employed to free their hostage. Byzantine control of the region had 
by this point effectively collapsed, yet the same cannot be assumed about Byzantine 
memory, identity, or Constantinopolitan influence. The thematic capital of Reggio 
surrendered in 1059, and the last remaining centre of imperial resistance at Squillace 
was evacuated soon afterwards.215 The ek prosopou of Gerace appears to have 
perished along with the Bishop of Cassano and their army during the last Byzantine 
counter-attack – Malaterra states that “scarcely no one escaped”216 – and no 
replacement is attested. The Duke’s friend Basil may have filled this vacant position, but 
there is no evidence for this. However, even if this was the case, his death at the 
beginning of the crisis meant that the city was without an effective leader, and decision-
making appears to have devolved into factionalism. Malaterra’s distinction between an 
“ignorant mob” and the “wiser men of the town,” along with Guiscard’s choice in directing 
his address to the “more sensible” of the lot, suggests that factions had formed 
according to whether they thought the Norman Duke should die or not. This division 
notwithstanding, the town appears to have been united in their desire to retain what 
autonomy they did possess under Count Roger’s suzerainty, demonstrated by their 
hostility to the construction of a citadel by the Duke, and their compromise with the 
Count some time later. The threats levelled against the city by both Hauteville brothers 
served to bridge the gap between the factions; self-preservation proved to be a source of 
common ground amongst the Geraci. Ultimately, the city of Gerace was forced to act 
collectively, in absence of imperial leadership, in order to retain what limited autonomy 
they could salvage.  
                                                     
214 Malaterra II.28, pp.27-28. Roger “felt them [the Geraci] to be traitors and thus hated them 
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215 Fall of Reggio: Malaterra II.34, p.16; Evacuation of Squillace: Malaterra II.37, p.17. 
216 Malaterra I.32, pp.15-16. 
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The city of Brindisi was located over 100 kilometres southeast from the Byzantine 
capital of Bari, along the Adriatic coast. In 1070, the year in which the following episode 
took place, most of Apulia had already fallen and Bari was under siege by the Normans; 
Brindisi was one of the few cities still offering organized resistance.217 Brindisi had 
recently been resupplied by the katepano, Abulchares, who had travelled throughout 
Apulia organizing the defences of the remaining cities still loyal to Constantinople before 
his death in 1068.218 The strategos Nikephoros Karantenos was the Byzantine officer put 
in charge of the defence of the city; if he was appointed by Abulchares, then he could 
have been appointed as early as 1064, when the katepano first arrived in the region, or 
as late as 1068, in which case he would have had at least some time to prepare for the 
arrival of the Normans. In the month of January, in 1070, the sources report that the city 
was being besieged by the Normans and that Karentenos despaired of retaining Brindisi 
for the empire. The strategos then hatched a plan, wherein he invited the Normans to 
negotiate the handover of the city. Their arrival took them up a staircase or ladder, 
where Karentenos received them, one at a time and killed them, one at a time; in the 
end he killed 83 of them.219 The strategos then took a ship across the Adriatic to 
Dyrrachion/Durazzo, and travelled directly to Constantinople, taking the heads of the 
slaughtered Normans with him as a kind of macabre curriculum vitae which he 
presented directly to the emperor, Romanos IV Diogenes (r.1067-1071). Two years later, 
Karentenos is attested as the doux of Skopje, in Byzantine Bulgaria, which represented 
                                                     
217 Primary account: Ann. Lupi. 178-179; Anon. Bar. 60.4-7; Sky. Cont. 169.5-19; See also:  
Richard Bünemann,“L’assedio di Bari, 1068-1071: Una difficile vittoria per Roberto il Guiscardo,” 
Quaderni medievali 27 (1989), 54-55. The Siege of Bari will be dealt with fully in Chapter 3. 
Brindisi had previously been captured by Guiscard in 1062, and it is not clear when it returned to 
Byzantine control: Ann., Lupi. 167. 
218 Sky. Cont. 168.26-169.1; Anon. Bar. 152-153; Abulchares was probably of Arab origins. 
Falkenhausen, La dominazione bizantina, 99. 
219 There is some disagreement on the numbers of dead: the two western sources both suggest 
the number 83 (40 Normans and 43 of their sergeants or servants (ministres)), while the sole 
eastern source rounds up to 100. Given the agreement of the two western sources, I prefer the 
lower number of 83. 
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quite the promotion.220 The new doux’s good fortune notwithstanding, the inhabitants of 
Brindisi seem to have been abandoned by their commander and left to fend for 
themselves. A similar situation occurred in Reggio in 1059, when the city’s garrison 
negotiated free passage for themselves and abandoned the city to its fate; Reggio was 
forced to surrender, as the Brindisi must have done.221 Robert Gusicard interrupted his 
supervision of the siege of Bari and descended in person to put an end to the siege at 
Brindisi, entering the city in late 1070 or early 1071. Ultimately, Brindisi would later serve 
as a launching point for Guiscard’s second expedition against Byzantium’s Balkan 
possessions.222  
The evacuation of imperial troops from Brindisi and Reggio was in keeping with 
Byzantine realism when faced with a losing situation. In 1083, the city of Larissa located 
in Thessaly, was being besieged by Guiscard’s eldest son Bohemund. The city was in 
dire straits, and the Byzantine commander sent a message to the emperor seeking aid, 
writing: “Your Majesty: unless you hurry with all speed to deliver us from this peril (for we 
cannot hold out any longer against so great a burden of war and famine) you, our 
emperor, if you do not bring aid quickly when you have the power to do so, you will be 
the first to be charged with treachery.”223 While the commander may have taken some 
                                                     
220 Skopje, the capital of the present day Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), was the capital of the 
doukaton of Bulgaria. The city was at the end of a major north-south artery that began at the 
Danube. Past Skopje lay the plains of Thessaloniki and the heartland of the empire. The 
importance of the position was reflected in its subordinates: the strategoi of Ochrid, Devol and 
Kastoria all reported to him. Anna Avramea, “Land and Sea Communications, Fourth-Fifteenth 
Centuries,” in The Economic History of Byzantium: from the seventh through the fifteenth century, 
ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 
2002), 1: 66;  Bojana Krsmanović, The Byzantine Province in Change (On the Threshold 
Between the 10th and 11th Century) (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Institute 
for Byzantine Studies; Athens: National Hellenic research foundation, Institute for Byzantine 
Research, 2008), 192-194. 
221 Siege of Reggio: Malaterra I.34,37, pp.16,17; Amatus IV.3, p.112; the garrison evacuated to 
nearby Squillace, where they were followed by Guiscard’s forces. Faced with the same losing 
situation, the remaining Byzantine forces evacuated that city and left Italy for good. 
222 Ann. Lupi. 213; Will. Apulia Book V, p.59. 
223 Alexiad II.5, pp.22-27. 
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liberties in being so forthright, it was understood that a soldier’s duty only went so far. 
Final responsibility rested with the emperor.224  
At about same time as Bari succumbed to Norman siege in 1071, the Byzantine 
city of Stilo in southern Calabria, was the site of a revolt against the Duke Guiscard. It so 
happened that Costa Condomicta, a member of one the leading families of Stilo was 
away in the service of the Duke at Isola, near Crotone, also in Calabria.225 Condomicta 
had previously rebelled from Guiscard, taking Stilo with him, but had reconciled with the 
Duke and returned the city to him. In Condomicta’s absence, a certain Costa Peloga was 
made governor of the place.226 Peloga was not a popular governor; indeed, Malaterra 
concludes his account of this episode with a warning: “so that those in authority may be 
warned not to allow the loyalty of their subjects to be alienated by unworthy servants.”227 
Peloga inflicted “cruel punishments” and “injuries” on the inhabitants, not even “sparing 
his own relations.”228 Particularly galling to Condomicita was the insult done to his 
grandmother Regina, who was arrested and beaten, allegedly for her “golden hen and 
chicks.”229 When word reached him, Condomicita feigned illness and returned home. 
Upon his arrival, he concealed his intentions from Peloga and canvassed the leading 
men of the city for their support. In exchange for their assistance, Condomicita promised 
to aid them in throwing off the Norman yoke – he brought them under Norman dominion, 
                                                     
224 The forwardness of Leon Kephalas, the governor of Larissa, may have been aided by the fact 
that he was the son of a servant of the emperor’s father. Alexiad II.5, p.23. The missive doesn’t 
appear to have damaged his prospects as attested by the numerous donations of properties he 
received. See: PBW, accessed 31 March, 2014, “Leon Kephalas, vestarches and primikerios of 
the vestiaritai,” http://db.pbw.kcl.ac.uk/pbw2011/entity/person/143402.  
225 Primary account of the episode: Malaterra II.44, p.39-40.  
226 Malaterra calls him stratigotus a corruption of the Greek, strategos. The Normans continued to 
use Byzantine titles well after the conquest. For instance, the title katepano continued in use in 
Bari for some time, but referred to a much more subordinate position. G.A. Loud, “Byzantine Italy 
and the Normans,” in Conquerors and Churchmen in Norman Italy Variorum Collected Studies 
Series CS658 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999), III:223. Malaterra doesn’t 
indicate whether Peloga was originally from Stilo or not, but his name alone indicates that he was 
Greek and most likely a member of the indigenous population. Given that Peloga was a blood 
relation of Condomicita, it seems likely that he was. 
227 Malaterra II.44, p.40. 
228 Malaterra II.44, p.39. 
229 Ibid. 
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therefore he could bring them out.230 The next day, Christmas day as it turns out, the 
plotters moved against the governor. After a short chase, Peloga was seized and put to 
death by the inhabitants, despite the protests of Condomicita who appeared to be having 
second thoughts about killing his blood relation. The inhabitants renounced their fealty to 
the Duke and remained in rebellion for nearly six years, causing “a great deal of 
trouble.”231 The leading men of Stilo, never quite comfortable under the Normans, took 
advantage of the insult caused to their erstwhile rebel leader, Condomicita, and 
maneuvered their way to more autonomy, securing freedom of action for at least the 
next six years, while at the same time taking revenge on the ‘unworthy servant’ who 
tyrannized them. While Byzantine Italy was mostly in Norman hands, memories of 
Byzantium had not necessarily faded. 
Such expressions of urban autonomy were not necessarily a phenomenon 
restricted to the imperial margins, indeed, they can also be found within the core 
provinces of the empire, in the very shadow of the Byzantine capital. Their presence at 
both the centre and the periphery is suggestive of the prevalence of byzantine modes of 
thought on political agency. In 1077, recall that the city of Raidestos rose against the 
emperor and joined the rebellion of Nikephoros Byrennios.232 The inhabitants were led in 
to rebellion by the wife of the local dynast, Ioannes Batazes, who was related to the 
rebel through her husband; she “managed to furtively convince many of the citizens of 
Raidestos with gifts and promises to side with her and join the conspiracy.”233 Many 
inhabitants must have been motivated by dissatisfaction over the recent imposition of an 
imperial grain monopoly.234 Agreement, however, was not unanimous in the city; Michael 
Attaleiates, the historian and judge who is also the source for this episode, came down 
firmly on the side of the emperor. Like Batatzina, Attaleiates was a local landowner, with 
                                                     
230 The text is garbled at this point, but given the context of the passage and the subsequent 
outcome of the episode, it is very likely that Condomicita promises to remove his support for the 
Duke’s dominion in Stilo. Having made this commitment, he was able to pledge many more 
people to his cause. 
231 Malaterra II.44, p.39. 
232 Attaleiates, Hist. XXXI.1-8, pp.443-455. See also: Dimitris Krallis, “‘Democratic’ Action in 
Eleventh-Century Byzantium,” 35–53. 
233 Attaleiates, Hist. XXXI.3, p.447. 
234 Raidestos may have hoarding grain in violation of imperial policy. Krallis, Michael Attaleiates 
and the Politics of Imperial Decline, 23-24. 
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substantial investments in the area and could access his own patronage network in the 
city.235 Indeed, he was alerted to the conspiracy by one of his clients, an unnamed 
conspirator who “owed” him a favour.236 However, whatever loyalty he may have 
commanded from his position, both as a local potentate and as a member of the imperial 
administration does not appear to have been sufficient to turn public opinion to the 
imperial cause, and Attaleiates was forced to flee the city and return to the capital.237 
Once the citizens had declared openly for the rebel Bryennios, they tore down the 
phoundax, the silo for the imperial grain monopoly, attacked the nearby fortress of 
Panion which had remained loyal to the emperor, and fortified the city’s harbor in 
anticipation of an attack by imperial forces.238 The significance of this episode rests first 
of all in the decision making process that the inhabitants took to join the rebellion. While 
Batatzina played a crucial role as the leader and instigator of the move, she nonetheless 
was required to consult with and convince the inhabitants to join her cause, thus 
ascribing agency to her fellow citizens. Moreover, her efforts were not completely 
successful; Attaleiates cannot have been the only holdout. However, once the decision 
had been made, the inhabitants of Raidestos, acting as a corporate body clearly 
identified and acted on their local interests, namely destroying the phoundax, assaulting 
nearby Panion and fortifying the harbor. The towns and cities of Thrace came out 
substantially in favour of Bryennios – Anna Komnene records that the citizens emerged 
with arms raised in acclamation – and one can imagine that similar deliberations were 
occurring throughout the region.239 In Raidestos to be sure, the people deliberated and 
acted as an autonomous urban polity and rebelled based on their terms, much like many 
of their Italian cousins who acted to defend the autonomy of their own cities, against the 
Norman advance. 
In the final analysis, the arrival of the Normans in southern Italy and their 
subsequent revolt and conquest of Byzantine southern Italy revealed urban polities 
                                                     
235 On Attaleiates’ investments and overall connections to Raidestos, see: Krallis, Michael 
Attaleiates and the Politics of Imperial Decline, 16-29. 
236 Attaleiates, Hist. XXXI.3, p.447. 
237 Attaleiates, perhaps naively, “trusted in the loyalty of the citizens of Raidestos, that the town 
would remain firm in its loyalty to the rulers out of gratitude.” Attaleiates, Hist. XXXI.2, p.447. 
238 Attaleiates, Hist. XXXI.8, p.453-455. 
239 Krallis, “’Democratic’ Action in Eleventh-Century Byzantium,” 46; Alexiad I.4.3, p.18. 
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exercising their political agency in the defence of their autonomy. The cases of 
Montillaro and Neocastrum, where locals lashed out violently against the Norman 
invaders, are evidence of the lengths to which urban polities would go to defend their 
independence. In Gerace and Bisignano, even when faced with losing propositions the 
inhabitants acted collectively to soften the imposition of Normans rule and secure what 
autonomy they could. Moreover, the cases of Brindisi and Reggio demonstrate, along 
with Larissa in Thessaly, that inhabitants were largely on their own when their imperial 
garrisons decided that duty had been sufficiently served and fled. Ultimately, the role of 
different indigenous factions was instrumental in local decision making processes in both 
western and eastern milieus, as was seen in Stilo and Raidestos respectively. This 
factionalism, and the political agency that supported it, is even more apparent in the 
Byzantine provincial capital of Bari, which forms the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
The City of Bari: A Case Study in Urban Political 
Agency 
Crowds came from every side, now of men, now of women, as if they were 
making a procession. Monks, priests, and all kinds of people came weeping to 
beg Argyritzos to deliver the city from the Normans. Argyritzos turned a deaf ear 
to their pleas, and wished neither to see nor to hear them, for by no entreaty did 
he intend to abandon what he decided upon. Almost four years had passed while 
they suffered this tribulation, and now through the actions of Argyritzos they were 
delivered. On the Saturday before Palm Sunday the glorious duke entered the 
city of Bari. He had grown thin from Lenten fasting but found new strength in the 
Easter Feast.240 
The 1071 Norman conquest of Bari is taken as the definitive and uncontroversial 
end of Byzantine rule in the Mezzogiorno, and this is true as far as it goes.241 However, 
the end of Byzantine political domination did not spell the end of the Byzantine influence 
in the region. Recall that many charters in the region continued to be dated according to 
tax indiction and imperial reign; the cultural impact of Byzantium on southern Italy was 
significant.242 An important part of that impact was evidenced in the implicit recognition 
of the legitimacy of popular political agency and the expectation that all citizens had a 
right to participate in urban decision making processes.243 These discursive processes 
and the foundation of political agency which supported them were on full display in the 
Byzantine provincial capital of Italy, Bari. The final Norman siege of the city revealed the 
presence of factionalism, as different groups argued over whether to continue resisting 
or to capitulate. Ultimately, the political agency of many of the inhabitants was frustrated 
                                                     
240 Amatus V.27, pp.145-146. 
241 See for example, Falkenhausen, “The South Italian Sources,” 95. 
242 See discussion in the Introduction, especially pp.6-8. 
243 Krallis, “’Democratic’ Action in Eleventh-Century Byzantium,” 35-53; On the Roman Republic 
as a form of democracy, see: Fergus Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998), 197-226; Psellos, Historia Syntomos, 8, p.7. 
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as their autonomy was ransomed to the Norman Duke; however, it is not the final 
resolution that matters, but the process. Popular participation in decisions of collective 
concern was on full display, not only during the siege itself, but also sixteen years later, 
when in 1087 a group of sailors returned to Bari with the relics of St. Nicholas. The 
outcome was different this time, but the phenomenon was the same. However, before 
turning to Santa Claus and his bones, this chapter will examine the siege of Bari and the 
factionalism that emerged during the Norman investment of the city, thereby exposing 
popular decision making processes and the political agency that served as their 
foundation. 
By the time of the final siege in 1068, Bari had already come under considerable 
pressure from the Normans who had targeted it ever since their arrival in the Italian 
peninsula. The Baresi may have in fact paid tribute to the Normans along with “all the 
fortified cities of Apulia,” following the defeat and the capture of the katepano 
‘Exaugustus’ Boioannes, in September of 1041.244 The city had even already undergone 
a short siege by the Normans who along with the Prince of Salerno, Guaimar III spent 
five days below the walls of Bari in January of 1043  before retreating, having “ravaged 
the fields and suburbs.”245 The Normans recognized the city as the key to Byzantine 
power in the Mezzogiorno and at the Council of Melfi in September of 1043 conceived of 
their strategy for the conquest of the Italian mainland with that in mind; Bari would be left 
for last, as the Normans made pushes from both the south and the north to encircle the 
city.246 As the seat of the katepano, Bari was an important political target for the 
Normans; a victory there would not only put an end to the last significant Byzantine 
outpost on the mainland, but also make possible a future assault on Dyrrachion/Durazzo 
across the Adriatic and open the Via Egnatia, the ancient military highway that led 
directly to Constantinople.247 Moreover, Bari was an important cultural and economic 
centre.248 William of Apulia remarked that “there was no city in Apulia which exceeded 
                                                     
244 Ann. Bari 23-5; Ann. Lupi. 138; Skylitzes XXI.3, pp.400-403; Will. Apulia Book II, p.22. 
245 Will. Apulia Book II, p.16; Anon. Bar. 151. 
246 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 99. 
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the opulence of Bari…wealthy and strongly-defended” and further “that by overcoming 
the rulers of so great a city he might therefore terrify and subject the lesser towns, for of 
all the cities along the Apulian coast, Bari was the greatest.”249 William of Apulia, and 
presumably the Normans whose plan he reports, recognized the towns and cities of the 
Mezzogiorno as calculating agents, susceptible to the pressure inherent in the fall of a 
provincial capital. Ultimately, the capital of the katepanoi offered a tempting and 
strategically important target.250 
However, Bari was not an easy nut to crack. The city sat on a short peninsula 
that jutted into the Adriatic Sea and as such was bordered on three sides by the sea. 
The landward approach was guarded by a short land wall that was easily manned by a 
small garrison.251 Bari had seen its share of conquerors leading up to the Norman siege, 
but very few had taken the city by storm. The 847 capture of the city by Muslims had 
been accomplished by treachery. In 876 the inhabitants surrendered the city to the 
Byzantines, in 982 it was betrayed into the hands of the katepano Kalokyros Delphinas, 
it surrendered to the katepano Basil Mesardonites after a sixty-one day siege in 1013, 
and then to Argyros, the son of Melos, in 1040.252 Bari had been besieged, to no effect 
by Otto II in 969; by the qa’id Saphi in 1003, when it was relieved by the Venetians; by 
Rayca and the qa’id Jacfar in 1023 for one day, and by the Normans and the Prince of 
Salerno in 1043 for five days.253 Only in 871, when the emirate of Bari was crushed by 
the Franks, was the city taken by storm.254 As the seat of Byzantine authority in the 
Mezzogiorno, the city could only have been strengthened since then, especially since 
                                                     
249 Will. Apulia Book II, pp.26-27. 
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the addition of the fortified praetorion by Basil Mesardonites in 1011.255 Moreover, while 
the Normans had been extremely successful in capturing cities throughout southern 
Italy, their experience of besieging fortified towns was limited to Messina in 1061, where 
the garrison had been mostly killed during a poorly executed sally; the Baresi would not 
be beaten so easily.256 
The siege began in earnest on August 5th, 1068. Duke Robert Guiscard had just 
finished suppressing a widespread revolt against his authority by his Norman vassals, 
including members of his own family that was financed by Byzantine authorities in 
Dyrrachion/Durazzo.257 Central imperial authority was absent on the mainland as the last 
katepano, Abulchares, had died organizing the defence of the few remaining cities still 
under Byzantine control earlier in 1068.258 Abulchares must have done his job well, 
because despite the absence of the katepano – or perhaps because of it – the Baresi 
faced the Normans with defiance, instead of fear.259 Malaterra reports that the Baresi 
“were not intimidated” and that “they held [Guiscard’s] siegeworks in contempt. They 
hung out their most valuable treasures on display and shouted insults.”260 In response to 
Guiscard’s demands, William of Apulia reports that the Baresi “made a disdainful 
response to the duke,” while Amatus of Montecassino explains that they “did not want to 
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 61 
abandon their loyalty to the emperor.”261 Not one to be discouraged, Guiscard began the 
siege by erecting ramparts and earthworks below the walls, while building numerous, 
and diverse siege engines in preparation for a general assault.262 Both William of Apulia 
and Amatus of Montecassino stress that the assault began soon after the start of the 
siege. Amatus reports that “when [Guiscard’s] knights attacked, the people of Bari came 
forth. However, more came forth to die than to give battle;” nonetheless, the Normans 
were unable to effect a breach.263 William of Apulia, on the other hand presents the 
Baresi as slightly more effective defenders, describing the siege as a contest between 
two wild boars, “both resisting fiercely and neither willing to give way” and further that 
“the Normans charged fiercely, and no less fiercely did the citizens resist.”264 The 
Norman duke did not neglect the battle at sea either, and “filled the sea with ships 
brought by the Calabrians.”265 Guiscard had his forces blockade the city’s ports, 
connecting his ships together by means of iron chains with bridges leading from shore 
as a means to bring reinforcements to bear quickly. However, the Baresi sallied forth 
and destroyed the bridges.266 The katepano, Stephan Pateranos, attempted to 
assassinate Guiscard, sending “a knight from foreign parts on whom the duke had 
previously inflicted a grave affront,” named Amerinus. His aim, not being equal to his 
rancor, was not true and the poisoned javelin narrowly missed Guiscard, passing 
                                                     
261 Guiscard demanded of the Baresi the house of Argyrus, which was located on a high point in 
the city. By holding the high ground, Guiscard hoped to control the city. Wil. Apulia II, p.26-27; 
Amatus V.27, p.143. 
262 Will. Apulia Book II, p.27: mantlets, siege-towers, and stonethrowers; Malaterra II.40, p.36: 
earthworks, battering rams, and ‘other machines’; Amatus V.27, p.143: siege-castles and 
catapults. The Normans had clearly learned a great deal of siege craft since their arrival in Italy. 
Bünemann suspects that they may have had help from the indigenous population, but the 
sources do not address it: Bünemann, “L’assedio di Bari,” 50. 
263 Amatus V.27, p.143. 
264 Will. Apulia Book II, p.27. 
265 Will. Apulia Book II, p.27. 
266 The nature and character of the naval blockade is a matter of some dispute between the 
sources. Both Malaterra and Amatus highlight the effectiveness of the blockade, while only 
William of Apulia reports that the Baresi were able to break through. Despite William’s evident 
pro-Byzantine bias I accept his account given the apparently open communications between Bari 
and Constantinople, the likely presence of Byzantine naval forces in the Adriatic and Norman 
inexperience at sea. Will. Apulia Book II, p.27; naval concerns: Loud, The Age of Robert 
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harmlessly through his cloak. Not wishing to take any more chances, Guiscard ordered 
that a stone hut be built to replace his quarters built of “leaves and branches.”267  
Despite the problems that the empire was having on its eastern front – the 
emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (r.1068-1071) was on constant campaign against the 
Seljuks during the siege – the Byzantine emperor was apparently able to send aid.268 
Amatus relates that Byzantios, the leader of the pro-Byzantine faction in the city (more 
on him later), travelled to Constantinople to plead for aid; he returned to Bari in 1069 
accompanied by the praetor Stephen Pateranos and the new katepano Avartutele, who 
carried with them a great deal of money for the defence of the city.269 Soon after, a 
second fleet arrived, at the urging of the katepano, with grain and a relief force, but they 
were defeated, along with a great many Baresi.270 A final fleet set out early in 1071, led 
by Joscelin of Molfetta, the former Norman rebel and Guiscard’s father-in-law; he had 
fled to Constantinople following the failed rebellion. However, the fleet was intercepted 
by a Norman naval squadron commanded by Guiscard’s brother, Count Roger of Sicily 
during a night attack. Despite their inexperience, the Normans emerged victorious from 
the encounter, marking their first naval victory.271 Joscelin’s flagship was taken and he, 
along with his war chest, was taken to Guiscard as a present. One can only imagine that 
family reunion. Exhausted after three long years of siege, and with no further expectation 
of relief from Constantinople, Bari surrendered on 16 April, 1071. Amatus records that 
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rejoiced at the novelty of this naval victory, hoping in consequence that he and the Normans 
might in future engage in battle at sea with more hope of success.” Will. Apulia Book III, pp.31-32.  
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when Guiscard entered the defeated city on the Saturday before Palm Sunday, the Duke 
“had grown thin from Lenten fasting, but found new strength in the Easter Feast.”272 
The significance of the siege rests not only in what it shows about an urban polity 
straining collectively against a common foe, but more importantly, what it brings to light 
about the internal governance of a city. Amatus’ account of the siege is unique in that it 
reveals the presence of at two factions in Bari during the siege. A pro-Byzantine faction 
led by Byzantios Guirdeliku, and a pro-Norman faction led by Argyritzos the son of 
Giannazzo.273 Byzantios carried the rank of patrikios and counted the katepano amongst 
his friends; Amatus reports that he had the favour of the emperor in Constantinople, a 
claim supported by his successful aid mission on behalf of the besieged city. He could 
also count on the support of at least one of the local families.274 Argyritzos on the other 
hand, had “more friends and relatives than Byzantios” – William of Apulia calls him the 
“leading citizen of the town” – and, at least towards the end of the siege, styled himself 
patrikios and antipathos, thereby associating himself with Byzantine power, even if he 
would not submit to it.275 Amatus reports that following the initial assault of the city and 
the subsequent naval blockade, Byzantios travelled “without delay” to the emperor in 
Constantinople in order to plead for aid directly.276 Argyritzos passed this information on 
to Guiscard, who dispatched a squadron of galleys to intercept this mission, but was 
unsuccessful in stopping him. This occurred sometime early on in the siege, before the 
first relief fleet arrived in 1069 and thus may represent a preexisting relationship 
between the Normans and Argyritzos. The enmity between these two factional leaders 
degenerated into open urban warfare shortly thereafter, and Byzantios was killed on 18 
                                                     
272 Amatus V.27, p.146. 
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La dominazione bizantina, 174. While the Byzantios was of Lombard stock; the name Byzantios 
is only attested amongst the local Lombard population: Martin, “Anthroponymie et onomastique à 
Bari (950-1250),” 683-701. 
274 The Malapezza family would suffer for their allegiance to Byzantios with the destruction of their 
homes. Amatus V.27, p.144; Anon. Bar. 153. 
275 Amatus V.27, p.144; Will. Apulia Book III, p.32; CDB IV, 45. 
276 Amatus V.27, pp.143-144. 
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July, 1070, en route to the katepano’s house by men sent by Argyritzos; his death is 
recorded in the Baresi annals as a treacherous assassination, and a murder.277 
While the death of Byzantios was an important event in the history of Bari, as its 
appearance in the annals attests, it also had a significant impact on the governance of 
the city. In the aftermath of the assassination, power seems to have swung decisively 
away from the pro-Byzantine faction and the Byzantine government represented by the 
katepano. Amatus relates that “as these events were occurring, men began to leave the 
katepano’s court and to frequent the palace of Argyritzos.”278 It appears that Byzantios 
formed an important power base for the katepano, for without his leadership many chose 
to stand with the other side. The new katepano was not able to maintain the loyalty of 
many of the citizens on his own, which is not altogether surprising given that he had only 
recently arrived.279 Argyritzos did not remain passive during these events, but actively 
fostered the allegiance of the people: he “encouraged his companions, aided the lesser 
people, gave provisions to the poor, incited them to be loyal to the Duke, and promised 
them gifts.” He was aided by the Duke who sent a ship of provisions to the city, and 
allowed Argyritzos to claim the credit for it; Guiscard similarly sent cash.280 This was in 
keeping with Byzantine charitable norms, where the rich and powerful were expected to 
help the less fortunate. Attaleiates writes that the poor and unemployed of 
Constantinople were in the habit of loitering around the houses of the rich in expectation 
of a handout, blithely called the ‘Jesus Tip’; even the emperor was expected to hold out 
an “abundant hand” as a matter of course.281 
Despite all these efforts, Argyritzos was still not able to claim the loyalty of the 
entire city. Notwithstanding the removal of Byzantios, and the flight of many of his 
supporters to the pro-Norman camp, he continued to encounter dissent. The supplies 
brought by the first relief fleet must have bought at least some loyalty to the katepano, 
who, it should be recalled, brought them to the beleaguered city. Amatus records that 
                                                     
277 Amatus V.27, pp.143-144; Anon. Bar. 153; Ann. Lupi. 180; 
278 Amatus V.27, p.144. 
279 Recall that Stephan Paterenos and Avartutele arrived with the first relief fleet in 1069. See 
above and discussion above: nt.269. 
280 Amatus V.27, p.144. 
281 Attaleiates, Hist. XXVI.8, XXXIII.4, pp.385, 503. 
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“the people” petitioned the katepano on two more occasions, seeking relief from the 
siege. These petitions would ultimately end with naval defeats for the Byzantine relief 
fleets, and the people finally turned to Argyritzos: “Monks, priests, and all kinds of people 
came weeping to beg Argyritzos to deliver the city from the Normans.”282 However, this 
plea should not be taken as an indication of allegiance to Argyritzos or to his cause. The 
entreaty came only once he had sent his daughter as a hostage to the Norman Duke 
and let it be known that he intended to surrender the city to the Normans. Moreover, it 
should be noted that before he did so, “he climbed up with his men into a high tower 
which he held for the duke,” thereby protecting himself from any ‘objections’ that may 
have come from the Baresi.283 Therefore, despite the assertion of William of Apulia that 
as a leading man he was able to “influence the minds of the lesser to persuade them to 
do” as he wanted, Argyritzos did not deliver a willing populace into the hands of the 
Normans, but was nonetheless able to impose his will on the city.284 
Robert Guiscard had a history of buying off cities, whenever he could avoid a 
protracted siege or risky battle. 285 In the case of Bari, however, Amatus’ account reveals 
the presence of pre-existing factional rivalries that complicated such tactics, and confirm 
the importance of opposing factions in city politics.  This was recognized by the newly 
arrived katepano who appears to have cultivated a relationship with the leader of the 
pro-Byzantine faction, Byzantios, in order to place his authority on a firm foundation. 
Byzantios, in essence, gave the city to the katepano, much like Argyros had a 
generation earlier, when he defected from the Normans in exchange for titles and the 
benefits that a close relationship with Constantinople could provide.286 However, it 
appears that Bari was not Byzantios’ to give. Argyritzos was able to profit from the 
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283 Amatus V.27, pp.145. It’s quite possible that this is the “house of Argyros” that William of 
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stresses caused in the city by the siege, and tap into a ready supply of outside aid. In 
exchange for feeding information to Guiscard, he was able to gain provisions and money 
for himself and his entourage thus elevating his position in the city. The murder of 
Byzantios and the subsequent failed relief attempts by the katepano and Constantinople 
only further solidified his position. It is no accident that William of Apulia called him 
“leading citizen” only at the end of the siege.287 However, his triumph on the parapets of 
the city, while final, was not a victory for Baresi urban autonomy. Argyritzos had to 
barricade himself in a high tower with his men before he was able to hand the city over 
to the Normans. His victory was a personal one, as we find Argyritzos entrusted with the 
city of Bari some years later.288 Ultimately, what is significant here is that even though 
the autonomy of the Baresi was ransomed to the Normans and their political agency 
frustrated by the machinations of Argyritzos, the interplay of the city’s factions revealed a 
body politic confident in its political voice. 
The factionalism that emerges during the siege of Bari has its parallels on the 
eastern periphery in the events leading up to the tenth-century siege of Antioch, and its 
immediate aftermath.289 The ascension to the throne of the commander of Byzantium’s 
eastern armies, the domesticos ton scholon Nikephoros II Phokas (r.963-969), saw an 
acceleration of Byzantine conquests in northern Syria.290 Byzantine forces had already 
made significant inroads against the Arabs of the region under the previous emperor: the 
city of al-Hadath (the Greek Adana), which controlled access through the Taurus  
mountains into Byzantine territory, was razed in 957; Crete was invaded in 960, and its 
capital Chandax captured the following year, while Aleppo was captured and sacked in 
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962.291 The Byzantine push into the region seems to have been accompanied by ethnic 
cleansing, as the inhabitants were massacred and mosques destroyed by the invading 
armies.292 When news spread to Arab territories, it caused religious violence as far away 
as Egypt as Muslims retaliated against Christians and their churches, while the Arab 
population of the border regions fled from the advancing Byzantine armies.293 This would 
surely have exacerbated tensions between Greek Christians and Arab Muslims still living 
in the region. 
In the lead-up to the siege of Antioch, the sources reveal a city rent by internal 
divisions. While the city had been in Hamdanid hands since its conquest by the emir of 
Aleppo in 944, Ali ibn Hamdan, more popularly known by his nom de guerre Sayf al-
Dawla (Sword of the Empire), the city did not appear to have been altogether pleased 
with the arrangement.294 As recently as 965, the Antiochenes had rebelled against the 
Hamdanid governor, Fath and delivered the city to a Tarsan refugee, Rachiq-an-Nasimi. 
One of the local notables, Ibn-al-Ahwazi supported him and helped him rule the city. 
Aided by a number of Dailamite defectors from the Hamdanid forces, they besieged 
Aleppo’s citadel for three months, before being driven off; Rachiq’s death during the 
siege seems to have ended the revolt.295 During this rebellion, the Christian community 
appears to have remained loyal to the Hamdanids; the Melchite patriarch, Christophoros 
is reported to have fled to the monastery of St Symeon the Stylite in Aleppo in order to 
forestall any charges of complicity in the treason by Sayf al-Dawla.296 The leading 
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Antiochene rebel, al-Ahwazi searched for him, but to no avail.297 The patriarch appears 
to have been something of a client of the Hamdanid ruler; Christophoros’ hagiographer 
reports that Sayf al-Dawla supported him during his election to the patriarchal throne and 
later lowered the Melchite community’s jizyah or head tax at this urging.298 
This loyalty, however, unfortunately cost the patriarch his life. Despite the 
successful intercession by Christophoros with Sayf al-Dawla to treat the conspirators 
mercifully, the patriarch had nevertheless made some powerful enemies among the 
Antiochene notables. The Arab Melchite Yaḥyā of Antioch, the source for these events, 
reports that the conspirators were jealous of the influence that the patriarch had on the 
Hamdanid ruler, and this intercession only further exacerbated these feelings.299 So 
when Sayf al-Dawla died on 8 February 967, the patriarch lost his patron and protector. 
Christophoros’ position became even more precarious when the city’s Hamdanid 
governor left Antioch for Aleppo in order to transport Sayf al-Dawla’s remains to their 
final resting place in Mayyafariqin; the inhabitants rebelled once again and took control 
of the city, swearing never to allow entry to another Hamdanid.300 Christophoros was 
now exposed and three Antiochene Muslim notables, Ibn-Manik, Ibn-Mohammed and 
Ibn-Di’amah, conspired together to do away with him. Despite being warned of the plot 
by his Muslim friend Ibn-Abdul’ Omar, the patriarch accepted an invitation to the house 
of Ibn-Manik where he was accused of conspiring with the Byzantines, a charge he 
denied, and was killed by a group of Khorasanians that the conspirators had retained for 
just such a purpose. The patriarch’s head was severed from his body and burned in the 
oven used to heat Ibn-Manik’s bath, while his body was taken straightaway to the ‘Gate 
of the Sea’ and tossed into the river Orontes.301  
Eight days later, the patriarch’s body was discovered by the Antiochene Christian 
community on an island in the river and was secretly interred in the monastery of 
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Arsenius located outside the city walls.302 Following the Byzantine capture of the city on 
28 October, 967, the patriarch’s assassins were captured and punished: Ibn-Manik was 
chopped up and tossed from the same “Gate of the Sea” that Christophoros’ body was 
ignominiously thrown, Ibn-Mohammed died in prison, while Ibn-Di’amah was tied to a 
rock and thrown into the river Orontes to drown.303 These events are evidence of 
factionalism within the city, divided along pro- and anti-Hamdanid lines. The Arab Muslim 
notables appear to have greatly resented their Hamdanid overlords, as suggested by 
their repeated rebellions against the governors of Sayf-al-Dawla. The Melchite 
community, on the other hand, enjoyed a protected status under the patriarch’s patron, 
Sayf-al-Dawla, which was a sore point for the Arab Muslim community in Antioch. 
Military successes by Byzantine armies in northern Syria, and the deliberate policy of 
pushing out Muslim populations from lands that they conquered would have only 
heightened the divisions between the different communities. Moreover, there may have 
been some truth in Ibn-Manik’s accusation of Byzantine complicity against the Melchite 
community, if not the patriarch, although there is no evidence for it. In any case, the 
death of Sayf-al-Dawla created a window of opportunity for the Arab Muslim faction to do 
away with their adversary, the patriarch. While there are no reports of general violence 
against the Melchite community, it is worth noting that the patriarch’s body was buried in 
secret outside the city and that the patriarchal throne remained vacant for over two years 
following the death of Christophoros.304 The Melchites eventually found protection under 
Byzantine dominion; during their capture of Antioch, Christians were singled out for 
preferential treatment, while everyone else was thrown into prison.305 They also received 
vengeance for the death of their patriarch as the conspirators were captured and 
punished by imperial authorities. The Melchites had successfully navigated the transition 
from favoured faction of Sayf-al-Dawla, to favoured faction of his worst enemy, the 
Byzantines. 
The patriarchate, however, was not able to maintain the good graces of the 
imperial administration in Constantinople and after over one hundred years of Byzantine 
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rule, the relationship had soured. In 1074, three years following the treason on the field 
of battle at Manzikert, and the military collapse of the eastern frontier to the Seljuk Turks 
that followed it, a new doux was posted to Antioch.306 Isaakios Komnenos, the elder 
brother of the future emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r.1081-1118), was sent by the 
reigning emperor, Michael VII Doukas (r.1071-1078) to replace the current doux, the 
magistros and kouropalates Katakalon Tarchaniotes.307 Antioch was in ferment, and 
Katakalon was “able only with difficulty to stem the movements of sedition that had 
broken out.” Moreover, a former compatriot of the deposed emperor Romanos IV 
Diogenes (r.1068-1071) had established himself in the nearby Taurus Mountains with a 
force of Armenians and was threatening imperial possessions in the region.308 The 
source of the disturbances was identified by the emperor as the patriarch Aimilianos, 
although, this may have had more to do with the logothete Nikephoros who was “from 
past times negatively disposed towards the patriarch.” In any event, Isaakios Komnenos 
was dispatched with orders to recall the patriarch to the capital. The city was divided 
among the supporters of the patriarch and those that favoured the notables. Fearful of 
the power that the patriarch held among the inhabitants, the doux created a ruse that 
drew Aimilianos away from the city, where he could not rely on his supporters. Divorced 
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from his power base, and with the city gates barred against him, the patriarch was forced 
to accept his recall to Constantinople.309  
However, that was not the end of the disturbances as the city remained divided. 
The newly prosperous classes, most likely those who previously supported the patriarch, 
rebelled and armed the crowd because they “burned with envy for those in power.” They 
barricaded the doux in the city’s citadel and attacked and killed the ruling classes, looting 
many of their homes in the process. Komnenos was able to put down the revolt by 
calling in reinforcements from nearby towns, but there was clearly a crisis of popular 
legitimacy in the city. It is clear from this account that the imperial administration, the 
source’s “ruling class,” had lost the support of not only “those who had recently risen in 
status,” but the lower classes as well, who were only too happy to vent their frustrations 
against their betters. However, the crowd is no mob, killing indiscriminately; once armed 
they struck surgically at the doux, whom they barricaded in the citadel, and killed “some” 
of the ruling class, looting their houses in the process. Without any other legitimate outlet 
for their discontent and this may have been a role played by the departed patriarch, the 
people turned to the only method for communicating their discontent: violence. 
Moreover, their deliberate acts demonstrate, on the one hand, their displeasure with the 
imperial administration, but also point to a possible explanation for this displeasure. It is 
revealing that the crowd is armed by the newly prosperous classes and that the crowd 
targets the homes of the ruling classes, in addition to their persons. Evidently, the 
material benefits of Byzantine administration were not flowing equally, or fast enough for 
some Antiochenes. This economic explanation is further supported by Komnenos’ 
ultimate solution to the discontent. In order to ingratiate himself to the inhabitants, the 
doux led a sortie against a passing force of Seljuks whose raids would surely have had 
significant adverse economic effects on Antiochene interests.310 While the doux may 
have been captured during the action, and his force defeated, he evidently got points for 
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trying because the inhabitants immediately dispatched gold to pay for his ransom. 
Ultimately, the doux is able to quell the discontent in the city, not through repression, 
something that Komnenos explicitly acknowledges when he sought to “befriend the 
Antiochenes,” but by instead listening to, and attempting to address their concerns. 
Factionalism was not new to the city of Bari. The annals record a number of 
different power centres active in the city over the years. Argyros, the son of the Lombard 
rebel Melos, is perhaps the representative of the most significant one. Argyros had been 
deported to Constantinople by the katepano Basil Mesardonites along with his mother 
Maralda as hostages following the first defeat of his father in 1011. Melos was finally 
defeated in 1018 and fled to the court of the Holy Roman Emperor Henry II where he 
died on 23 April, 1020 trying to raise an army for another attack on Byzantium’s 
possessions in southern Italy.311 However, with his death, Argyros was free to return to 
Italy along with his family in 1029 and by 1042 his star had risen to such an extent that 
he was elected “Prince and Duke of Italy” by the Baresi and the Normans.312 However, 
before he had reached such lofty heights, Argyros took advantage of the power vacuum 
created by the death of the katepano, Nikephoros Dokeianos in the city of Ascoli on 9 
January, 1040.313 The provinces of southern Italy were already restive when the 
katepano died because of levies imposed by the Byzantines for Maniakes’ 1038 invasion 
of Sicily.314 Amatus records that “the Apulians and Calabrians were obliged by the 
emperor’s money to take part in this arduous campaign, and this stirred up the people 
and the nobles.”315 In the month of May, tensions boiled over as two Byzantine officials 
were killed by the konteratoi, the local militia.316 Before his death, the katepano had 
gathered the konteratoi around himself, presumably in an effort to forestall any rebellious 
thoughts on the part of his subjects. That he died in Ascoli, instead of at his 
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headquarters, could indicate that the katepano had already lost control of the situation in 
Bari. In any event, the annals report that following a short siege, the konteratoi entered 
Bari on 25 May, led by a certain Musondo, along with none other than Argyros, who had 
somehow managed to place himself amongst the leaders of this revolt. Once inside the 
city, Argyros moved against Musondo, wounding him and “binding his hands, threw him 
into prison with Giovanni of Ostuni, and all the konteratoi were dispersed.”317 The fact 
that Argyros was able to imprison Musondo, and survive, demonstrates that he must 
have had supporters among the konteratoi. Moreover, the fact that Argyros was able to 
then disperse the konteratoi shows that his support base extended even further among 
the Baresi. This episode demonstrates that there existed numerous factions that only 
emerged in the absence of a representative of the imperial centre, but which must have 
been present prior to the death of the katepano. The new katepano, Michael Dokeianos, 
presumably a relative of his predecessor, arrived in Bari six months later and 
immediately executed four people thereby reasserting Byzantine dominance in the 
city.318  
Factional lines did not remain static in the city, but changed according to shifting 
circumstances. In 1045, Argyros returned along with his family to Constantinople with 
the patrikios Constantine Chagé, who had accompanied the new katepano, Eustathios 
Palatinos to Bari.319 Argyros appears to have made his mark at the imperial centre, for 
Skylitzes records that he advised the emperor during the siege of Constantinople by Leo 
Tornikos and led the sole sortie against the rebel army, doing “great harm” to the 
enemy.320 He returned to Italy in 1051 with the additional title of magistros, however, in 
his absence other factions had risen to prominence. Argyros arrived in Otranto, the main 
Byzantine port on the Adriatic and travelled directly to Bari, however, his entry to the city 
was barred by a certain Adralisto and the brothers Romaldo and Pietro, who appear to 
                                                     
317 Ann. Bar. 19; Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, 47. 
318 Ann. Bar. 20; Dokeianos the younger came directly from Sicily and was most likely 
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319 Anon. Bar. 151; Ann. Lupi. 147. Chagé was the leader of Kibyrrhaioton theme, stationed in 
Attaleia, and Admiral of the fleet. He is attested as something of a naval hero, having defeated a 
number of Saracen pirates: Skylitzes XIX.9, p.376, XXI.4, p.404. It is unclear why such a high 
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represent a prominent faction.321 Fortunately, Argyros still retained a great deal of loyalty 
among the people of the city for “the Baresi received him without the consent of Adralisto 
and the others.”322 Argyros’ entrance to the city was not without opposition, however, as 
two inhabitants were killed, Liboni and Mele Malapezza, while the Jewish quarter was 
put to the torch.323 Ultimately, Argyros would arrest the brothers Romoaldo and Pietro 
and deport them to Constantinople in chains, while Adralisto would escape to Norman 
Count Humphrey.324 Argyros was able to reassert his dominance and put down the 
factions that had risen to prominence in his absence, a dominance that he was 
apparently able to retain until his final journey to Constantinople in 1055.325 
The curious events surrounding the arrival of the relics of St. Nicholas in Bari in 
1087, two years after the death of Duke Robert Guiscard, reveal an urban polity acting 
collectively to pursue and defend their own local interests. Following the siege of Bari 
and the effective end of the Byzantine dominion in southern Italy, the city and its citizens 
continued to act collectively in defence of their interests. In the immediate aftermath of 
the siege, Guiscard turned his attention to Sicily and its conquest. However, in order to 
successfully besiege Palermo, he would require ships and sailors, something that the 
Baresi could provide; indeed this may have been a key reason for the siege in the first 
place.326 This need, plus the fact that the city was not conquered by force but by 
treachery, put the Baresi in a position to extract certain concessions from Guiscard, 
despite their status as a defeated city. In exchange for following “him wherever they saw 
him go,” Guiscard returned their “fields, estates and farms,” allowed those that wished it 
to return to Byzantine territory along with the last katepano, Stephen Pateranos, and 
                                                     
321 Adralisto owned a number of houses in Bari so must of have been of some means. His 
fortunes appear to have rebounded following the death of his supporters at the court of the 
katepano in 1038; his house was torched along with that of his cousin Leo. In 1047 he feuded 
with and captured the Alfaraniti, as well as burning the house of Iaonnes Hikanatos. Ann. Bar. 
149, 151. He may have been related to the important  Anatolian family Adralistoi, which were 
connected to the Phokas. See: Jean-Claude Cheynet, “Les Phokas,” in  Le traité sur la guérilla 
(De velitatione) de l'empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963-969), eds. by G. Dagron and H. Mihaescu 
(Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1986), 311 and note 74. 
322 Ann. Lupi. 153. 
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324 Ann. Lupi. 153. 
325 Ann. Bar. 152. 
326 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard, 137. 
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promised not to build a citadel or establish a garrison in their city, a promise that would 
be kept until the twelfth century.327 Moreover, Bari would be ruled by one of their own, 
Agyritzos, the leader of the pro-Norman faction in the city.328 These must be the 
“extravagant promises” that Guiscard made to the pro-Norman faction during the siege 
reported by William of Apulia.329  
Bari would honour its commitments – to a point – and the sources find the Baresi 
participating in numerous battles alongside their Norman conquerors. Immediately after 
the siege in 1071, they mustered in the city of Reggio, and along with other Calabrians, 
Greeks and Normans, followed Guiscard to Sicily to participate in the siege of Palermo, 
possibly providing the ships needed to press the siege.330 Once Palermo was captured, 
the Baresi continued on to the city of Melfi, whence Guiscard pursued his conquest of 
Apulia.331 Amatus of Montecassino records that the Duke would also visit Bari on 
occasion; he convalesced there in 1073, and visited the city on a tour of his realm not 
long after.332 In 1079, Bari rose in rebellion, joining in the general uprising against 
Guiscard that spread through nearly all of southern Italy. They were defeated, however, 
in battle outside their very own walls, and besieged. The city was forced to surrender in 
1080.333 Possibly with this betrayal in mind, the Duke extracted significant tribute from 
the city in 1083 and 1084; the exaction of ‘many torments’ would add to the 
imposition.334 During the Norman siege of Dyrrachion/Durazzo, a deserter from Bari 
                                                     
327 Will. Apulia Book III, pp. 32, 36. Not all the remaining Greeks returned to imperial: 
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served as envoy between the Duke and a disgruntled Venetian named Domenico, who 
betrayed the Balkan port to the Normans.335  
Following the death of Robert Guiscard in 1085, Bari does not reappear in the 
narrative sources again until 1087, when the annals report that “in the month of May, the 
body of the most blessed Saint Nicholas Archbishop of Myra, was taken from the afore-
said Myra by a few Baresi, and brought to Bari, the head of all the cities of Apulia.”336 
The incident is recounted in detail by the Benedictine monk Nikephoros, whose account 
can be dated to the following year and is thus near contemporary. An additional account 
also survives by the archdeacon John, written by 1089, but is so similar to the account 
by Nikephoros as to raise the possibility that they may have worked from the same 
source.337 
Nikephoros recounts that a group of sixty-two sailors, forty-two hailed from Bari, 
dropped anchor in Myra, a port city on the southern shores of Asia Minor, on their return 
trip from Antioch.338 Hearing that the Venetians were planning a similar expedition, these 
Baresi sought to claim the remains of the fourth-century Saint Nicholas for themselves 
and their city.339 Nikephoros claims that their motivations were unselfish, and that their 
journey was divinely inspired while the sailors alternatively defended their quest as a 
mission from the Pope, sanctioned by the saint himself, who had appeared to them in a 
vision.340 However, the sailors’ claims were probably mere inventions designed to 
deceive the monks guarding the relics, rather than indications of any premeditation; 
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indeed, the seemingly improvised arrival of the relics in Bari certainly suggest this.341 
Rather, the sailors appear to have been taking advantage of the chaos caused by the 
“foreign and infidel hordes” who had overran Asia Minor in successive waves following 
the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert; the citizens of Myra had only recently returned from 
their mountain hideouts.342 Arriving in Myra, the sailors travelled straight to the sanctuary 
that held the remains of the saint. Their cover, however, was immediately blown by the 
monks guarding the tomb who accused them of wanting to remove the saint to their own 
city. The sailors proceeded to alternatively threaten, cajole, and lie in an attempt to get 
their hands on the saint. The tomb raiders may have had the help of an inside man: one 
of the monks left with them on their ship, and was heckled and attacked by the 
townspeople of Myra, who tried to stop the ship by taking hold of the oars and rudder.343 
The Baresi then boarded their ship with the remains of the saint, making their way past 
the townspeople who had gathered after the being alerted by the monks, and made the 
rather circuitous journey back to southern Italy. 
The arrival of the sailors in the city of Bari, along with their sacred cargo, followed 
a short stop at the harbour of St. George some four miles distance from the city in order 
to build a “most beautiful casket” and caused quite a stir.344 The translation of the relics 
of St. Nicholas was the occasion of a heated discussion on the placement of the saint’s 
remains and is evidence of a body politic, conscious of the role of individual citizens in 
civic decision making processes. Some called for a new sanctuary to be built on the site 
of the former Byzantine praetorion, as the sailors had taken a solemn vow to do, while 
others called for them to be placed in the Cathedral. What is interesting in this 
discussion is that no social or economic distinction is made between the various 
townspeople; no leading men emerge to direct the discussion, nor do any factions 
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develop, beyond advocating for one option or the other.345 The only distinction that is 
made in the text is that between the sailors who had translated the relics and the 
townspeople who receive them; it seems that an ad hoc popular assembly was formed 
at the harbour, and that it was open to all citizens. Recall the case of Raidestos, which 
similarly deliberated and later acted as a body politic as they elected to join the rebellion 
of Nikephoros Bryennios; even though the local dynast Batatzina played a prominent 
role in the deliberations, once decided the citizens acted in concert to advance and 
protect their own local interests, much as the Baresi were beginning to do at the 
harbour.346 In anticipation of a decision, the sailors placed the remains in the care of the 
abbot of St. Benedict, Elias, the future archbishop of Bari, and kept the monastery under 
guard “lest they be deprived of the holy relics by some stratagem.”347 
The townspeople had immediate cause to defend the relics, for upon hearing of 
their arrival, Archbishop Ursus immediately travelled from nearby Canosa to Bari to take 
possession of the holy cargo, but was repulsed by the “sailors and the townspeople.”348 
The archbishop’s position had recently suffered a blow with the death of his sponsor, the 
Duke Robert Guiscard two years previous and was seeking to buttress his authority in 
Bari; the arrival of the relics provided just such an opportunity.349 The people of Bari, 
sent “prudent and wise men” to the archbishop in an effort to dissuade him from his plan, 
but were unsuccessful.350 As with the ad hoc popular assembly held at the harbour, this 
embassy is evidence of an urban collective acting together to protect their interests, in 
this case, from an outside force: the archbishop. They would shortly have the opportunity 
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to defend their interests with force, as following the failure of the ambassadors, the 
archbishop sent an armed party to capture the relics by force of arms; two of 
archbishop’s men and one of the townspeople were killed in the resulting mêlée. The 
Baresi, fresh from victory removed the relics from the monastery of St. Benedict and 
translated them to the chapel of St. Eustratios, located in the praetorion. The chapel, 
along with the other three Byzantine era chapels of St. Demetrios, St. Basil and St. 
Sophia were razed to create room for the new basilica that would house the relics; an 
armed guard remained in place to prevent thefts.351 
This curious episode in the history of Bari is revealing for a number of reasons. 
The arrival of the remains of St. Nicholas reveals an urban collective acting together to 
identify and defend their own interests. They debate the disposition of the relics freely 
and are un-swayed by outside interference. The nominal overlords of Bari, the Normans, 
are in fact completely absent from all of the accounts and the one outsider who 
attempted to interfere, the deceased Duke’s man on the ground, the archbishop Ursus, 
is categorically repulsed in both word and deed. The Baresi instead entrust their relics 
with a local cleric, the future archbishop and at the time abbot of St. Benedict, Elias. 
Moreover, the people decide together to build the new crypt in the praetorion, making 
sure to guard the relics carefully until it is built. In the process the Baresi razed the four 
Byzantine chapels, signalling in deeds, if not in words, a certain break with the eastern 
empire. Ultimately, the move to bring the relics of St Nicholas was a positive one, even if 
it was not premeditated. Now that Bari was outside the empire, the city was no longer 
able to compete economically with Venice, which now had better access to Byzantine 
markets; the Baresi acted to defend those interests when the opportunity presented 
itself. The revenues that the waves of pilgrims brought in would help offset these losses 
at precisely the time they were needed most.352 
This chapter has exposed the role of factionalism in the deliberative processes 
that constituted urban governance. The siege of Bari revealed the presence of pro-
Byzantine and pro-Norman factions engaged in various expressions of political agency. 
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While each group sought to have their individual agendas realized, ultimately, the pro-
Norman faction was victorious and the political agency of many Baresi was frustrated as 
Argyritzos ransomed the city’s autonomy to the Norman Duke. This factionalism wasn’t 
new to the city and became more pronounced as imperial authority withered in the 
Byzantine provincial capital in the 1040s. In the absence of strong imperial leadership, 
different factions emerged and vied for political dominance in the city. In the end, 
Argyros, son of the Lombard rebel Melos, emerged victorious, securing increased urban 
autonomy for the city, while maintaining strong ties to the imperial centre, highlighting 
the strong cultural draw of Constantinople on the western periphery. External factors 
could have a significant effect on urban polities, as seen in the case of Antioch. There, 
the patriarch’s power in the city relied on his relationship to the Hamdanid ruler; the shift 
to Byzantine rule saw the imposition of the imperial will on the city. The new doux was 
able to sideline the patriarch and reassert imperial authority on the city through the 
cultivation of a new relationship with the Antiochenes, thus implicitly validating the 
political agency of the inhabitants. Political modes of thought that emphasized a role for 
popular political agency survived in to the Norman period, as was seen in the translation 
of the relics of St. Nicholas in 1087. There, the political agency and urban autonomy 
expressed during an ad hoc popular assembly carried the day, as the will of the 
inhabitants was realized in the face of outside political interference. In the final analysis, 
the citizens that inhabited the city of Bari conceived of themselves as political agents, 
whose participation in deliberative urban decision making processes was seen as both 
legitimate and expected. 
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Conclusion 
In the summer of 921, the Constantinopolitan patriarch, Nicholas I Mystikos, sent 
a letter to “the priests, archpriests, nobles and the general body of the people of 
Longobardia.”353 The patriarch, who was himself a transplanted Lombard, was acting in 
the capacity of emissary to the people of Italy and was responding to their recent petition 
to make Landulf I of Capua strategos of Longobardia and to plead forgiveness for their 
rebellion. Landulf had recently led a rebellion against the Byzantine administration in 
Italy, even killing the highest Byzantine official in the region, the strategos Urseleon at a 
21 April battle outside of Ascoli. In an effort to contain the situation, the patriarch had 
addressed an earlier letter to the rebel Landulf, forgiving him his trespasses and granting 
him Urseleon’s position as military governor of the region. In return, the emperor 
demanded through the patriarch that Landulf surrender the cities he had occupied, 
swear fealty to the emperor and send another son to Constantinople as a hostage, to 
join the one already there.354 The rebellion evidently caused a flurry of missives back 
and forth between Constantinople and Italy; indeed, two responses are preserved 
among the surviving letters of Mystikos to the Archbishop of Otranto and the 
protospatharios Gaidon, a Lombard noble.355 The significance of these events rests not 
so much in the extent of pragmatism with which the imperial centre dealt with rebellion 
on the western periphery, rather it is the approach taken by the patriarch. Mystikos 
addressed his letter to “both rulers and ruled,” the entire body politic of Italy, thereby 
acknowledging the importance of all levels of society for imperial rule. Moreover, the 
patriarch’s response speaks to the reciprocal relationship between the emperor and the 
inhabitants of the western periphery, offering forgiveness in exchange for loyalty. The 
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imperial centre was willing to grant everything that the people of Italy desired, complete 
forgiveness and the elevation of their chosen leader, the rebel Landulf, to the 
governorship of Longobardia; the only condition that is made is their consent, that is, the 
consent of the governed. 
Many scholars have taken offers of forgiveness such as these as signs of 
weakness on behalf of the imperial centre, pointing to the low priority that the south 
Italian territories must have been for the Byzantine emperors.356 Constantinople certainly 
had its hands full during the first half of the tenth century and it is doubtful that the 
emperor could have spared many troops to send to Italy; indeed, when the military 
situation finally stabilized at the imperial centre, only a small force of 1,453 cavalry, and 
415 Rus infantry were dispatched.357 Given the strategic situation, calls by the patriarch 
to “do those things which are for your salvation, your interest, and your settled peace 
and prosperity” and the implicit threat that such a call contained, must have rung hollow 
to his Italian audience.358 However, notwithstanding the real and perceived weakness of 
Constantinople, the flip-side of central imperial weakness has been left completely 
unaddressed in the scholarship on the region, that is, the political strength of the 
inhabitants of the empire’s periphery. The mere request for a change in leadership in the 
same breath as a plea for forgiveness is indicative of a mature body politic, confident 
that their request would at the very least be heard, if not acceded to. The inhabitants of 
the Mezzogiorno saw their relationship between themselves and the centre as one of 
consultation and not of dominion tout court. They had a role to play in the governance of 
the empire and they expected their voices to be heard and at the very least 
acknowledged by the emperor. 
This case study has argued that popular political agency was alive and well in 
Byzantine southern Italy. Following its ninth-century nadir, Byzantine power rebounded 
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and imperial authority spread throughout the southern Italian peninsula. By the arrival of 
the Normans at the turn of the millennium, the provincial administration was thick on the 
ground, with imperial officials in every city, recording land transfers, settling disputes, 
and collecting taxes, amongst other official acts. The medieval Byzantine state, in other 
words, was pervasive. Moreover, the presence of these bureaucrats was not neutral; 
rather it had an important effect on local modes of thought and behavior that lasted well 
past the end of Byzantine dominion in the Mezzogiorno. Southern Italians may have 
accessed a Byzantine identity that looked to their Roman heritage of the res publica, 
what the Byzantines called politeia and as such may have seen themselves as having 
an important role in the political process. This political role was facilitated by the ranking 
Byzantine official in the region, the katepano, who was granted a great deal of freedom 
of action by the imperial centre and used that discretion to deal pragmatically with the 
inhabitants of Byzantium’s westernmost province. 
When the Normans first arrived in the region from northern France, southern Italy 
was materially prosperous, but politically restive. The population was expanding, along 
with the economy, as southern Italy took part in a Mediterranean-wide recovery. 
However, Muslim raids form Sicily and North Africa, and the failure of the Byzantine 
provincial administration to protect their Italian subjects saw an increase in popular 
discontent; increased taxation certainly did not help the situation. By the fourth decade of 
the new millennium, when the Normans rebelled against their former Byzantine masters 
and began carving out their own domain, southern Italians were ready to listen. The 
quick defeat of Byzantine forces in Apulia saw many of the major cities on the Adriatic 
coast come to terms with the Normans. However, as the Normans slowly advanced and 
consolidated their hold on the region, cities and their inhabitants put up their own 
defence as they sought to preserve some degree of autonomy. Resistance took a 
number of different forms depending on the circumstances; some slaughtered their 
Norman garrisons, while others directed their wrath against the leadership; some were 
initially successful in preventing the construction of citadels, while others acquiesced in 
the face of a losing situation. Even though Byzantine forces were ultimately unsuccessful 
in their efforts to halt the Norman advance, they generally went down fighting; Reggio 
and Brindisi were the exceptions, and not the rule. In the capital city of Bari, where the 
katepano had his headquarters, the collective autonomy that was visible during the final 
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Norman siege of the city from 1068 to 1071, could still be found there sixteen years later, 
when a group of sailors returned home from the city of Myra, with the relics of St. 
Nicholas. Ultimately, the modes of thought that underpinned the Baresi’s understanding 
of themselves as political agents outlived the Norman Duke who ‘conquered’ them and 
could be seen on the docks of their city as they assembled to decide on the fate of their 
sacred prize. 
A key goal of this study has been to offer a corrective to the image of Byzantium 
as an empire with a strong and often tyrannical central government that left no room for 
popular political autonomy. Contrary to this view, the emperor, and by extension, his 
representatives were expected to consult with their subjects or at the very least, take 
their interests into account. In Byzantine southern Italy, city after city acted to defend 
their interests against the Normans as they advanced across the peninsula. However, 
this is not to say that the imperial centre was so weak on the periphery that the will of the 
emperor could not be felt. Whether through inducements, as in the case of Argyros and 
others who received imperial titles and rewards, or through terror, as in the case of the 
nameless victims of imperial wrath who were hanged from the walls of Bitonto by the 
newly arrived katepano, imperial will existed alongside the state apparatus that 
facilitated it, even at the edges of empire. However, this study was limited to highlighting 
the presence of political autonomy on the western frontier and leaves unanswered the 
exact relationship between the imperial centre and the periphery. Furthermore, while this 
examination has proceeded under the assumption that southern Italians drew on a 
common Roman heritage of political agency based on the res publica, the evidence for 
this at the moment is merely suggestive, not definitive. More work is clearly needed on 
provincial identities; did provincials see themselves as Byzantine citizens, fully invested 
in the empire, or as merely subjects to it? What role did their Roman heritage play in 
their expressions of political agency? Additionally, the eastern periphery is ripe for a 
similar study where expressions of political agency can also be found in abundance, but 
remain as of yet unexamined; the Armenian cities of Ani and Arcn show especial 
promise. Moreover, the presence of political agency on the imperial frontiers has 
consequences for the core of the empire; if political agency is a product of Byzantine 
administration, then the phenomenon should a fortiori be present at the centre, where 
the imperial will would be most keenly felt. Lastly, the scope of this study has been the 
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eleventh century, but it is clear from the events leading up to the destruction of Bari by 
King William I ‘the Bad’ in 1156 that opened this thesis, and the 921 letters of Nicholas I 
Mystikos that closed it, that political agency in the Mezzogiorno was not limited to the 
years of the Norman Conquest. The phenomenon of political agency, within the 
Byzantine imperial framework, was much more widespread than has been previously 
acknowledged in the scholarship. 
As moderns of a particular western mindset, we tend to equate democracy with 
the act of voting, as if the simple act of trotting off to the voting booth every four years is 
all that is required to guarantee the robustness of our democratic way of life. However, 
while voting may be a necessary component of our modern conception of democracy, on 
its own, it is hardly sufficient. In addition to the usual institutions, and requisite checks 
and balances, there needs to be a commitment to the principle of popular legitimacy. 
This study has revealed a number of medieval voices seeking to have their voices heard 
by the imperial centre. If the reply by the patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos to the people of 
Longobardia is any indication, those voices were heard and often given their due. In a 
way, this thesis has been a case study of democracy, just without the voting. While 
Byzantines would react strongly against the term, eschewing the connotations of social 
chaos and mob rule, the underlying notions of political agency and popular legitimacy 
contained in our modern understanding of democracy would have rung true to them. It is 
hoped that this study has lifted the hush that was imposed on the inhabitants of 
Byzantine Italy first by conquest, then by scholarship and reinforced to us moderns the 
importance of heeding the voices of the people. 
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